The Strategy of Social Choice
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23402106 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hervé Moulin (0000-0003-3358-6290) |
| Year | 1983 |
| Pages | 214 |
| Publication date | 1983-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | The strategy of social choice (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Elsevier (PUBLISHER • RU) |
| DOI | 10.1016/c2013-0-11866-1 |
| OpenAlex | W1534285264 |
| Open Library | OL21436541M |
| ISBN | 9780444863713 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 37 |
Mathematical economics · Critical Realism in Sociology · Mathematics · Social Capital and Networks · Social Policy and Reform Studies · Game theory · Mathematical models · Social choice · Voting
The Impossibility of a Preference-Based Power Index
The superdominance relation, the positional winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet
A Hypergraph Approach to Conflict
Tacit co-operation in three-alternative non-cooperative voting games
Sophisticated Behavior under Majoritarian and Non-Majoritarian Voting Procedures
Rights as alternative game forms
Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
On the ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility of vote share and veto share rules
Minimally strategy-proof rank aggregation
The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives
Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision
On the manipulability of voting rules
A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination
A lemma in open sequential voting by veto
On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of finite games with perfect information which may have cycles
Flexible Majority Rules in democracyville
Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof
Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value
Vetoing in social choice with blockings
Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules
Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
A characterization of the Borda rule in peer ratings
Non-cooperative implementation
Symmetric majority rules
Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
Introduction to the special issue in honor of Hervé Moulin
The Scientific Model of Causality
The responsiveness of approval voting
Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules
The positive theory of legislative institutions
On anonymous and weighted voting systems
Effectivity functions and efficient coalitions in Boolean games
Freedom of choice
Accounting for Heterogeneity, Diversity and General Equilibrium in Evaluating Social Programmes
| Unique citing works | 37 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.84 |
| Citation span | 1982 - 2026 (45) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |