Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11284194 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Issofa Moyouwou (0000-0003-3145-1616, Université de Yaoundé I, corresponding author), Hugue Tchantcho (0000-0001-8346-2048, Université de Yaoundé I) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 89 |
| Pages | 70-82 |
| Publication date | 2017-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.06.006 |
| OpenAlex | W2739356872 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 28 |
Computer security · Econometrics · Economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Voting · Vulnerability (computing · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Law
Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games
Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
Scoring rules, ballot truncation, and the truncation paradox
Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting
Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions
Manipulation of Voting Schemes
Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
Interacting double monotonicity failure with direction of impact under five voting methods
The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles
Closeness matters
Multi-winner scoring election methods
Susceptibility to manipulation
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2022 (3) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |