Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11286624 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mostapha Di (0000-0003-2070-5801, Université de franche-comté, corresponding author), Boris Tsvelikhovskiy (0000-0003-0798-7218, Northeastern University) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 111 |
| Pages | 11-18 |
| Publication date | 2021-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.02.002 |
| OpenAlex | W3089036110 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 25 |
Anti-plurality voting · Approval voting · Bullet voting · Cardinal voting systems · Class (philosophy · Economics · Group (periodic table · Machine learning · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Preference · Scoring rule · Voting · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Artificial Intelligence
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions
Manipulation of Voting Schemes
Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
On the manipulability of voting rules
The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles
The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation
Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity
Susceptibility to manipulation
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |