Don’t Look Now
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8397268 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Arif Ahmed (0000-0001-7826-3335, University of Cambridge, corresponding author), Bernhard Salow (0000-0002-4437-8211, University of Cambridge, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 70 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 327-350 |
| Publication date | 2019-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axx047 |
| OpenAlex | W2753899710 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 33 |
Good’s theorem is the apparent platitude that it is always rational to ‘look before you leap’: to gather (reliable) information before making a decision when doing so is free. We argue that Good’s theorem is not platitudinous and may be false. And we argue that the correct advice is rather to ‘make your act depend on the answer to a question’. Looking before you leap is rational when, but only when, it is a way to do this. 1. Introduction2. Good’s Theorem3. Inexact Observation4. Independence5. Conditionality 5.1. The principle5.2. Revisiting the counterexamples6. Conclusion
Advice (programming) · Conditionality · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Political science · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Putting Logic in its Place
Knowledge and its Limits
Risk and Rationality
Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty
Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque
Questions
Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
A theory of anticipated utility
Risk Aversion and Expected-utility Theory
Prospect Theory
Rational Reflection1
Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering
Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles
A Contrast Between two Decision Rules for use with (Convex) Sets of Probabilities
Coherent choice functions under uncertainty
Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist
Options and Diachronic Tragedy
Counterfactual Desirability
A Little Learning Can Be Dangerous
On the Principle of Total Evidence
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |