Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules

Bibliographic Data

ID11286149
AuthorsWilliam V Gehrlein (0000-0001-5974-8791, University of Delaware, corresponding author)
Year1982
Volume2
Issue2
Pages123-130
Publication date1982-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueMathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118
PublisherElsevier BV (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90061-0
OpenAlexW2042545119
LanguageEN
Citations received13
References cited10

Condorcet method · Constant (computer programming · Element (criminal law · Mathematical economics · Scoring rule · Stage (stratigraphy · Statistics · Voting · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics · Multi-Criteria Decision Making

  • Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains

    Open Access•Thérèse Embigne Killanga, Issofa Moyouwou et al.•Social Choice and Welfare•2025

  • Analyses géométriques et probabilistes des règles de vote, avec une application au scrutin majoritaire à deux tours

    Vincent Merlin, Dominique Lepelley•Revue économique•1999

  • Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis

    Open Access•Mark C Wilson, Geoffrey Pritchard•Mathematical Social Sciences•2007

  • The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters

    Open Access•William V Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley•Mathematical Social Sciences•2001

  • The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes

    Open Access•William V Gehrlein, Issofa Moyouwou et al.•Mathematical Social Sciences•2013

  • The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist

    Open Access•William V Gehrlein•Mathematical Social Sciences•2004

  • The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections

    Open Access•Dominique Lepelley, Frédéric Chantreuil et al.•Mathematical Social Sciences•1996

  • The expected likelihood of transitivity for probabilistic choosers with single-peaked preferences

    Open Access•William V Gehrlein•Mathematical Social Sciences•1993

  • On the probability of electing the Condorcet

    Open Access•Dominique Lepelley•Mathematical Social Sciences•1993

  • Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity

    Open Access•Dominique Lepelley, Fabrice Valognes•Public Choice•2003

  • On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule

    Open Access•William V Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley•Public Choice•2003

  • Probability calculations for transitivity of simple majority rule with anonymous voters

    Open Access•William V Gehrlein•Public Choice•1990

  • The impact of social homogeneity on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules

    Open Access•William V Gehrlein•Social Science Research•1987

  • Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles

    Open Access•William V Gehrlein, Peter C Fishburn•Public Choice•1976

Unique citing works13
Citations per year0.33
Citation span1987 - 2025 (39)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 13

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae