William V Gehrlein
Biographic Data
| ID | 4268845 |
|---|---|
| NAME | William V Gehrlein |
| GIVEN NAMES | William V |
| FAMILY NAME | Gehrlein |
| SIGNATURE | GEHRLEIN W V |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Delaware |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5974-8791 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 23 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 96 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 23 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1975 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)
Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)
Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)
A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser
The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist
On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule
The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
Condorcet Efficiency of Borda Rule under the Dual Culture Condition
The expected likelihood of transitivity for probabilistic choosers with single-peaked preferences
Probability calculations for transitivity of simple majority rule with anonymous voters
The probability of intransitivity of pairwise comparisons in individual preference
The impact of social homogeneity on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules
The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
Scoring rule sensitivity to weight selection
Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
Scoring rule and majority agreements for large electorates with arbitrary preferences
Social homogeneity and Condorcet's paradox
The effects of abstentions on election outcomes
Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and positional voting rules
Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles
Borda's rule, positional voting, and Condorcet's simple majority principle
A comparative analysis of methods for constructing weak orders from partial orders
This paper compares three methods (sequel, cardinal, maximal) for constructing a weak order from a partial order on a finite set. The constructed weak orders include the partial order. To evaluate the methods, several different selection disciplines were used to stochastically generate partial orders from a fixed linear order. The error of a weak order which includes a generated partial order is a function of the number of ordered pairs added to …
Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles
The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
Borda's rule, positional voting, and Condorcet's simple majority principle
The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and positional voting rules
Social homogeneity and Condorcet's paradox
A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser
The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
The probability of intransitivity of pairwise comparisons in individual preference
On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule
Probability calculations for transitivity of simple majority rule with anonymous voters
Scoring rule and majority agreements for large electorates with arbitrary preferences
Condorcet Efficiency of Borda Rule under the Dual Culture Condition
The impact of social homogeneity on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules
A comparative analysis of methods for constructing weak orders from partial orders
This paper compares three methods (sequel, cardinal, maximal) for constructing a weak order from a partial order on a finite set. The constructed weak orders include the partial order. To evaluate the methods, several different selection disciplines were used to stochastically generate partial orders from a fixed linear order. The error of a weak order which includes a generated partial order is a function of the number of ordered pairs added to …
A comparative analysis of methods for constructing weak orders from partial orders
This paper compares three methods (sequel, cardinal, maximal) for constructing a weak order from a partial order on a finite set. The constructed weak orders include the partial order. To evaluate the methods, several different selection disciplines were used to stochastically generate partial orders from a fixed linear order. The error of a weak order which includes a generated partial order is a function of the number of ordered pairs added to …
Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles
Borda's rule, positional voting, and Condorcet's simple majority principle
The effects of abstentions on election outcomes
Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and positional voting rules
Social homogeneity and Condorcet's paradox
Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
Scoring rule and majority agreements for large electorates with arbitrary preferences
Scoring rule sensitivity to weight selection
The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
The impact of social homogeneity on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules
The probability of intransitivity of pairwise comparisons in individual preference
Probability calculations for transitivity of simple majority rule with anonymous voters
The expected likelihood of transitivity for probabilistic choosers with single-peaked preferences
Condorcet Efficiency of Borda Rule under the Dual Culture Condition
The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule
The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist
The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser
Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)
Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)
Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)
Mathematics (18 works) · Computer Science (17 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (17 works) · Mathematical economics (15 works) · Law (14 works) · Political science (14 works) · Voting (14 works) · Condorcet method (13 works) · Statistics (12 works) · Law (11 works)