The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11284669 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William V Gehrlein (0000-0001-5974-8791, University of Delaware, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1985 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 199-209 |
| Publication date | 1985-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/0165-4896(85)90043-5 |
| OpenAlex | W1976060283 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
| References cited | 12 |
Approval voting · Condorcet method · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Political science · Selection (genetic algorithm · Simple (philosophy · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics · Artificial Intelligence
Combining Diversity and Excellence in Multiwinner Elections
Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections
Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting
Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation
Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
Multi-winner rules analogous to the Plurality rule
A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection
Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences
Which set of agents plays a key role? An impossibility in transforming binary relations
How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee
Frequency of paradox in a common n-winner voting scheme
Multi-winner scoring election methods
Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting
Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited
Selecting Committees
| Unique citing works | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.47 |
| Citation span | 1992 - 2025 (34) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 16 |