Problems of Majority Voting
Reply to a Traditionalist
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10174679 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gordon Tullock (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1961 |
| Volume | 69 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 200-203 |
| Publication date | 1961-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/258456 |
| OpenAlex | W2054179975 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
Democracy · Economics · Mathematical economics · Political science · Politics · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law
Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare
Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare
Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare
Rational Choice and Congressional Norms
James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock on the Weaknesses of Majority Voting
Anthony Downs and the Equilibrium Theory of Democracy
Logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities
What should government do? Problems of social cost, externalities and all that
Political Equilibrium and the Provision of Public Goods
Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading
| Citations per year | 0.19 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1973 - 2021 (49) |
| Highly cited | No |