James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock on the Weaknesses of Majority Voting

A Triptych

Bibliographic Data

ID13035017
AuthorsJ Grandjean (0000-0001-8903-4749, École nationale d'administration, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume11-1
Pages49-76
Publication date2021-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueOEconomia (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2113-5207 • E-ISSN: 2269-8450
PublisherAssociation Œconomia (PUBLISHER • FR)
DOI10.4000/oeconomia.10780
OpenAlexW3166834825
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited30

This paper provides a narrative of the different but complementary accounts of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock on the weaknesses of simple majority voting. The paper shows that these authors took different paths to reach the same conclusion. Buchanan used his knowledge about Knut Wicksell which he applied to an abstract framework. Tullock was inspired by his reading of Duncan Black and Anthony Downs and between 1959 and 1961 in particular, produced numerous published and unpublished works which formed the basis of his contribution to The Calculus of Consent. This book which was jointly authored by Tullock and Buchanan proposes a theoretical reflection on majority voting. The present paper examines Buchanan and Tullock’s critique of majority voting and highlights the radical but overlooked contribution made by Tullock to the book and to the development of the Virginia public choice research program

Physics · Political science · Political Theory and Influence

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