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Illiquid Banks, Financial Stability, and Interest Rate Policy

Bibliographic Data

ID10175779
AuthorsDouglas W Diamond (0000-0002-1625-502X), Raghuram G Rajan (0000-0003-4135-4940)
Year2012
Volume120
Issue3
Pages552-591
Publication date2012-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/666669
OpenAlexW2891649014
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited15

Banks finance illiquid assets with demandable deposits, which discipline bankers but expose them to damaging runs. Authorities may not want to stand by and watch banks collapse. However, unconstrained direct bailouts undermine the disciplinary role of deposits. Moreover, competition forces banks to promise depositors more, increasing intervention and making the system worse off. By contrast, constrained central bank intervention to lower rates maintains private discipline, while offsetting contractual rigidity. It may still lead banks to make excessive liquidity promises. Anticipating this, central banks should raise rates in normal times to offset distortions from reducing rates in adverse times

Business · Economics · Financial crisis · Financial fragility · Financial stability · Financial system · Fragility · Interest rate · Macroeconomics · Market liquidity · Monetary economics · Too big to fail · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Economic theories and models · Finance · Global Financial Crisis and Policies

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Unique citing works6
Citations per year0,5
Citation span2014 - 2025 (12)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 6

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