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Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Goods in Pseudomarkets with Constraints

Bibliographic Data

ID10177966
AuthorsFaruk Gül (Princeton University), Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Princeton University), Mu Zhang (0000-0002-7228-4466, Princeton University)
Year2024
Volume132
Issue11
Pages3708-3736
Publication date2024-03-25
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/730561
OpenAlexW4393164240
LanguageEN
References cited21

Economics · Microeconomics · Auction Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems

  • (Near-)Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities

    Thành Nguyen, Rakesh Vohra•Journal of Political Economy•2024

  • Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions

    Herman B Leonard•Journal of Political Economy•1983

  • The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions

    Aanund Hylland, Richard Zeckhauser•Journal of Political Economy•1979

  • The Combinatorial Assignment Problem

    Eric Budish•Journal of Political Economy•2011

Highly citedNo

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