Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10179856 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Herman B Leonard (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1983 |
| Volume | 91 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 461-479 |
| Publication date | 1983-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/261158 |
| OpenAlex | W2024694589 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 14 |
| References cited | 7 |
The problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered. Individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned. A set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested. It is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem. Both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited. The procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well. It results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and "consumer surplus" is maximized; its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria
Dual (grammatical number · Economic surplus · Economics · Element (criminal law · Function (biology · Incentive · Linear programming · Mathematical economics · Mathematical optimization · Microeconomics · Optimal allocation · Outcome (game theory · Perfect competition · Set (abstract data type · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Optimization and Search Problems
Simultaneous Pooled Auctions with Multiple Bids and Preference Lists
Lone wolves in competitive equilibria
Macrojustice
The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents
Multi-Item Auctions
Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Goods in Pseudomarkets with Constraints
Competitive Fair Division
A unifying model for matrix-based pairing situations
On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem
Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game
Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets
Strategy-proof allocation of objects
Strange Bids
| Unique citing works | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
| Citation span | 1984 - 2024 (41) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 13 |