The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth
Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10180657 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aarón Tornell, Andrés Velasco (0000-0003-0441-5062) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 100 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 1208-1231 |
| Publication date | 1992-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/261858 |
| OpenAlex | W1999769146 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 37 |
| References cited | 6 |
The authors analyze a differential game in which all interest groups have access to a common capital stock. They show that the introduction of a technology that has inferior productivity but enjoys private access may ameliorate the tragedy of the commons. The authors use this model to analyze capital flight: in many poor countries, property rights are not well defined; since "safe" bank accounts in rich countries (the inferior technology) are available to citizens of these countries, they engage in capital flight. They show that the occurrence of capital flight does not imply that opening the capital account reduces growth and welfare. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press
Capital (architecture · Capital deepening · Capital flight · Capital formation · Commons · Developing country · Economic capital · Economic growth · Economics · Financial capital · Foreign direct investment · Human capital · Incentive · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Physical capital · Political science · Private capital · Property rights · Tragedy of the commons · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Policy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law
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| Unique citing works | 37 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,16 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2022 (29) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 37 |