Interventions and Conflict Incentives
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12891739 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thorsten Janus (0000-0002-6989-5258, University of Wyoming, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 191-208 |
| Publication date | 2009-04-28 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ethnopolitics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1744-9057 • E-ISSN: 1744-9065 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/17449050802246064 |
| OpenAlex | W2014345495 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 24 |
Recent literature suggests that well-intentioned third-party intervention in military conflict can lead to moral hazard by acting as a subsidy to rebellion. In this paper, the following are suggested: failure to intervene can also lead to conflict, which will be called the ‘insufficient deterrence’ problem; and a classification scheme for potential conflicts in the world, which can be used to derive the optimal intervention policy on a case-by-case basis. The optimal policy may be to intervene at random because certainty in some cases will encourage parties who benefit from intervention or parties who lose to attack. The model also suggests that post-conflict aid and a siding-with-the-winner approach may promote the incidence of conflict, even if such policies lower the loss from unavoidable conflicts
Certainty · Conflict avoidance · Conflict resolution · Conflict resolution research · Deterrence (psychology · Deterrence theory · Economics · Incentive · International conflict · Intervention (counseling · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Psychological intervention · Subsidy · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology
The European Union as a Global Actor
Overconfidence and War
Making War and Building Peace
Moral hazard, intervention and internal war
The hazards of thinking about moral hazard
Suicidal rebellions and the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention
When does intervention make sense
Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental Organizations
When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality
Contracting for aid
Foreign economic aid; should donors cooperate
The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth
Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars
Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information
Third-party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts
The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention
Rationalist explanations for war
Mitigating the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention
Give War a Chance
The Delusion of Impartial Intervention
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |