Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10183038 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul Milgrom (0000-0003-0784-9181, Stanford University), Ilya Segal (0000-0001-8605-3020, Stanford University) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 128 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-31 |
| Publication date | 2019-04-18 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/704074 |
| OpenAlex | W2935786499 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 35 |
We study the class of multiround, multiproduct clock procurement auctions that reduce offered prices at each round. When prices stop declining, the remaining bidders become the winning sellers. For single-minded bidders, each such auction has five properties not shared by Vickrey auctions: each is obviously strategy-proof and group-strategy-proof, sets prices that are Nash equilibrium winning bids in the related first-price auction, preserves winner privacy about values, and can be extended to satisfy a budget constraint. In simulations of the US incentive auction, a heuristic clock auction from this class achieves quick computations, high efficiency, and low prices
Auction theory · Class (philosophy · Combinatorial auction · Common value auction · Economics · English auction · Generalized second-price auction · Heuristic · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Proxy bid · Revenue equivalence · Reverse auction · Spectrum auction · Unique bid auction · Vickrey auction · Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Game Theory and Voting Systems
| Citations per year | 0.6 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |