Cutting in Line
How Powerful Organized Interests Hasten & Delay Executive Branch Nominations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10189166 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J M Box-Steffensmeier (0000-0002-0878-6269, The Ohio State University), D P Christenson (0000-0003-4072-5391, University of Washington), Lauren Ratliff Santoro (0000-0002-8914-4507, University of Texas), Elizabeth Ann Steffensmeier, Elizabeth Steffensmeier (Cornerstone Research) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1115-1129 |
| Publication date | 2025-04-22 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/736336 |
| OpenAlex | W4409677726 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 62 |
Despite the potential to shape policy in every domain of government, organized interests have not been central to discussions of the nomination process for bureaucratic appointments. We test measures of the quantity of interest group opposition and support for nominees as well as the power of groups on nomination outcomes and duration. Using an original data set of interest involvement in nominations from the 106th to 115th Congresses, we find that powerful interests affect the timing of executive branch nominations for confirmation and return. Interests weigh in on nominations when the stakes are high, and legislators heed the call of the most powerful groups over the sheer number of groups. The influence of interests in the committee stage is similar but limited. Our analysis shows that organized interests affect the bureaucracy before nominees make it to office by speeding up or slowing down their time to confirmation, return, or withdrawal.
Business · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Economics · Executive branch · Executive functions · Executive summary · Law and economics · Line (geometry · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Finance · Law · Mathematics · Neuroscience · Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology · Public Policy and Administration Research · Social Psychology
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |