When Are Juridically Autonomous Agencies Responsive to Elected Officials? A Simulation Based on the Costa Rican Case

Bibliographic Data

ID10189615
AuthorsMichelle M Taylor (0000-0002-9718-4584, Mitchell Institute, corresponding author)
Year1995
Volume57
Issue4
Pages1070-1092
Publication date1995-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.2307/2960402
OpenAlexW2142458729
LanguageEN
References cited19

There has been much study of the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis society. This article, however, focuses on autonomy within the state--the ability of elected officials to control the bureaucracy so that it will implement their policy goals even when the relevant agency has juridical autonomy, versus when such agencies can pursue their own policy goals. Juridically autonomous agencies are an important subset of the bureaucracy in most Latin American democracies; thus this subject merits study because of its implications for bureaucratic accountability and the legitimacy of democratic government. Through simulation, using a model of Costa Rican bureaucratic politics, we learn that when elected officials desire a higher level of service production than the agency wants, they are unable to induce the agency to respond and can inadvertently cause it to produce less efficiently. However, when the agency wants to produce more service than elected officials desire, the executive can use the budget to constrain the agency and overall efficiency is enhanced

Accountability · Agency (philosophy · Autonomy · Bureaucracy · Democracy · Government (linguistics · Legitimacy · Political science · Politics · Social science · Sociology · State (computer science · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies

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