The Shadow of the Future and Bargaining Delay
An Experimental Approach
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10191557 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lindsay Hundley (Stanford University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 82 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 378-383 |
| Publication date | 2019-08-27 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/706051 |
| OpenAlex | W2970506925 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 12 |
Can the shadow of the future undermine international cooperation? While James Fearon proposed that long time horizons incentivize states to prolong costly negotiations, empirical tests of this model have yielded conflicting results. Using a laboratory experiment, I estimate the causal effect of the shadow of the future on bargaining delay and examine its welfare consequences. I show that while parties do take longer to reach agreements when the shadow of the future is long, there is no significant welfare lost compared to agreements made under shorter time horizons. These findings suggest an important caveat to policy recommendations that call for the use of finite duration provisions to shorten international negotiations. These provisions are unlikely to resolve the underlying inefficiency of the bargaining period and may inadvertently decrease states’ welfare by shrinking the potential gains from cooperation
Economics · Political science · Shadow (psychology · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · International Development and Aid · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology
Bargaining over International Multilateral Agreements
Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy
The Dark Side of the Future
Thinking Ahead
The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
Do Finite Duration Provisions Reduce International Bargaining Delay
Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment
Contracting around International Uncertainty
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |