Bargaining over International Multilateral Agreements
The Duration of Negotiations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11895646 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nicole Simonelli (Purdue University West Lafayette, corresponding author), Nicole M Simonelli |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 147-169 |
| Publication date | 2011-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Interactions (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0305-0629 • E-ISSN: 1547-7444 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/03050629.2011.568845 |
| OpenAlex | W2047869317 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 36 |
This article examines the duration of international multilateral agreement negotiations. Based on propositions in the literature concerning factors which may have an effect on the length of negotiations, I derive testable hypotheses concerning the involvement of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations in the negotiation process, the number of negotiating parties, and the duration of the agreement. These hypotheses are tested using new data collected from the negotiations of 168 multilateral agreements. I find that whether a nonstate actor makes the first proposal does have an effect on the duration of multilateral agreement negotiations, but this relationship is conditional on issue area. In particular, when an intergovernmental organization makes the first proposal for security-related agreements, negotiations are longer, but the opposite is true for non-security agreement
Business · Duration (music · Economics · International economics · International trade · Negotiation · Political science · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
From Letter to Twitter
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Do Finite Duration Provisions Reduce International Bargaining Delay
Event History Analysis
War and Change in World Politics
Multilateral Negotiations
Can NGOs Enhance the Effectiveness of International Negotiation
The Role of the ICRC in the Development of International Humanitarian Law
Confronting the Nuclear-Armed States in International Negotiating Forums
Colleagues or Combatants? Experts as Environmental Diplomats
How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations1
The Promise of Institutionalist Theory
Taming commodity markets
Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law
Recasting the European Bargain
Modeling Duration Dependence
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions
A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation
Political leadership and regime formation
The demand for international regimes
The politics of international regime formation
Challenging conventional explanations of international cooperation
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
Negotiation arithmetic
Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism
Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control
Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions
Modeling the forms of international cooperation
The Rational Design of International Institutions
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
Multilateralism with small and large numbers
Reversing the Gun Sights
Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements
Parametric Models, Duration Dependence, and Time-Varying Data Revisited
Contracting around International Uncertainty
| Citations per year | 0.85 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Highly cited | No |