Reasons Have no Weight
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10344200 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dalia Drai (0000-0003-3699-5970, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 270 |
| Pages | 60-76 |
| Publication date | 2017-04-13 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqx025 |
| OpenAlex | W2643859681 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 9 |
Practical reasoning is often described as weighing reasons. When one deliberates about what to do one puts all the reasons for the action on one side and all the reasons against the action on the other side. The balance between both sides determines the outcome of the deliberation. Assuming that this description is correct, the next question is how the different reasons for and against the action determine the outcome of the deliberation. This is the place where the notion of weight enters. The natural answer is that every reason for or against an action has a weight, and the weights of all the reasons involved determine what one should do. The aim of this paper is to argue that this answer is wrong; weights of reasons have no role in a theory of reasoning
Action (physics · Balance (ability · Deliberation · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Natural (archaeology · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · History · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |