Humean agent-neutral reasons
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8090156 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daan Evers (0000-0001-7055-930X, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 55-67 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Explorations (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13869790802635614 |
| OpenAlex | W2124323923 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 6 |
In his recent book Slaves of the Passions, Mark Schroeder defends a Humean account of practical reasons (hypotheticalism). He argues that it is compatible with ‘genuinely agent-neutral reasons’. These are reasons that any agent whatsoever has. According to Schroeder, they may well include moral reasons. Furthermore, he proposes a novel account of a reason's weight, which is supposed to vindicate the claim that agent-neutral reasons (if they exist), would be weighty irrespective of anyone's desires. If the argument is successful, it could help avoid an error-theory of moral language. I argue that it isn't, and that we should reject a Humean approach to reasons
Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Passions · Practical reason · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Philosophy
Normative Source and Extensional Adequacy
Ends to Means
On Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism
Promotionalism, orthogonality, and instrumental convergence
Expressing (outweighed) reasons
Simple Probabilistic Promotion
Reasons Have no Weight
Why I’m still a proportionalist
Contrastive Reasons and Promotion
Prudence, Morality, and the Humean Theory of Reasons
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2025 (15) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |