The Perceptual Present

Bibliographic Data

ID10344249
AuthorsAbigail Connor (University of Manchester), Joel Smith (0000-0003-3836-7046, University of Manchester)
Year2019
Volume69
Issue277
Pages817-837
Publication date2019-04-21
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqz017
OpenAlexW2944354927
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited34

Phenomenologically speaking, we perceive the present, recall the past, and anticipate the future. We offer an account of the temporal content of the perceptual present that distinguishes it from the recalled past and the anticipated future. We distinguish two views: the Token-Reflexive Account and the Minimal Account. We offer reasons to reject the Token-Reflexive Account, and defend the Minimal Account, according to which the temporal content of the perceptual present is exhausted by its direct reference to the interval of time over which it occurs

Cognitive psychology · Computer security · Content (measure theory · Interval (graph theory · Perception · Recall · Reflexivity · Security token · Sociology · Time perception · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Neuroscience · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

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