Does the value of rational activity explain the badness of human extinction
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10344342 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Owen Clifton (Queen's University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Publication date | 2025-02-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqaf003 |
| OpenAlex | W4407793948 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 28 |
Why postpone human extinction? The dominant view is utilitarian: postponing extinction matters if it maximizes the net sum of happiness that is ever enjoyed. But, many object, we have reason to make people happy, not to make happy people. Plus, the utilitarian view does not explain why failing to postpone extinction matters terribly if the future it would cost our species is utopian, but not if it is dystopian. For, a dystopia may contain a greater net sum of happiness than a utopia. I therefore consider a budding alternative: postponing extinction matters if it ensures the ongoing instantiation of rational activity. Regretfully, I show this view faces objections analogous to, but more robust than, those that beset its utilitarian rival. For example: we have reason to make people rational, not to make rational people. I conclude by pointing to another alternative that critics of the utilitarian view ought to investigate further
Aesthetics · Dystopia · Economics · Epistemology · Extinction (optical mineralogy · Happiness · Object (grammar · Physics · Political science · Positive economics · Sociology · Utopia · Value (mathematics · Law · Mathematics · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Human Extinction
On What Matters
Why Worry About Future Generations?
Death and the Afterlife
V.—utilitarianism and New Generations
The Value of Humanity
On the survival of humanity
Humanity and the future
Conservatisms about the Valuable
Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion
Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry
Human Extinction and Our Obligations to the Past
Human Extinction and Moral Worthwhileness
Two Distinctions in Goodness
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
Must We Be Just Plain Good? On Regress Arguments for the Value of Humanity
Humanity as an object of attachment
Future People, the Non‐Identity Problem, and Person‐Affecting Principles
High Risk, Low Reward
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |