On What Matters
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23599005 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Derek Parfit (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Publication date | 2017-12-21 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | On What Matters (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780198778608.001.0001 |
| ISBN | 9780198778608 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 43 |
This third volume of this series develops further previous treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. It engages with critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences. This volume is partly about what it is for things to matter, in the sense that we all have reasons to care about these things. Much of the book discusses three of the main kinds of meta-ethical theory: normative naturalism, quasi-realist expressivism, and non-metaphysical non-naturalism, which this book refers to as non-realist cognitivism. This third theory claims that, if we use the word ‘reality’ in an ontologically weighty sense, irreducibly normative truths have no mysterious or incredible ontological implications. If instead we use ‘reality’ in a wide sense, according to which all truths are truths about reality, this theory claims that some non-empirically discoverable truths — such as logical, mathematical, modal, and some normative truths — raise no difficult ontological questions. This book discusses these theories partly by commenting on the views of some of the contributors to Peter Singer's collection Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity .
Cognitivism (psychology) · Epistemology · Explication · Expressivism · Meaning (existential) · Metaphysics · Morality · Naturalism · Normative · Objectivity (philosophy) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology
The Future is Already Here
Avoiding Moral Commitment
Should Philosophical Reflection on Ethics Do Without Moral Concepts
Poverty, Exploitation, Mere Things and Mere Means
No need to get up from the armchair (if you’re interested in debunking arguments in metaethics)
In Search of the Trinity
In Evaluating Technological Risks, When and Why Should We Consult Our Emotions
Risk, Technology, and Moral Emotions
On the ethics of naturalism
Creating and Redirecting Threats
The Type-B Moral Error Theory
Narcissism and Wellbeing
No puzzles about truth for nonrealist cognitivism
On the possibility of wholesale moral error
Fittingness and Consequentialism
Non‐Naturalist Realism and Quietist Constructivism
Relaxed realism, robust realism, and the truthmaker challenge
Naturalism and normative cognition
Two grounds of liability
Realism and metanormativity
Strangers to ourselves
Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truthmaking, and Ontological Cheating
Ethics and Theism
Reason monolithism
What Normativity Cannot Be
Do We Have Reasons to Obey the Law
Ahlaki Gerçekçiliğin Ontolojik Statüsü
Relaxed Realism and Modal Nothingism
The significance of success
On the Importance of Species for Rule-Consequentialism
Human Extinction and Our Obligations to the Past
Subjective Consequentialism and the Unforeseeable
Can anti-natalists oppose human extinction? The harm-benefit asymmetry, person-uploading, and human enhancement
The semantic challenge to non-realist cognitivism overcome
Moral underdetermination and a new skeptical challenge
Getting machines to do your dirty work
Does the value of rational activity explain the badness of human extinction
Relaxed realism and normative belief
The Moral Universe
Le quasi-réalisme et l'argument de la coïncidence
A Moral Fine-Tuning Argument
Beyond Theism and Atheism
A Dilemma for Sterba
| Unique citing works | 43 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,78 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 43 |