Beyond Theism and Atheism
Axiarchism and Ananthropocentric Purposivism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079879 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tim Mulgan (0000-0002-9368-1524, University of Auckland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Publication date | 2017-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12420 |
| OpenAlex | W2622547614 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 24 |
Two familiar worldviews dominate Western philosophy: materialist atheism and Abrahamic theism. One exciting development in recent philosophy of religion is the exploration of alternatives to both theism and atheism. This paper explores two alternatives: axiarchism and ananthropocentrism. Drawing on the long tradition of Platonism, axiarchists such as John Leslie, Derek Parfit and Nicholas Rescher posit adirectlink between goodness and existence. The goodness of a possible worldiswhat makes it actual. Ananthropocentric Purposivism (AP) holds that the universe has a purpose and that humans are irrelevant to that purpose. If there is a God, then God cares about what matters, but we do not matter to God
Atheism · Epistemology · Materialism · Platonism · Theism · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Religious Studies and Spiritual Practices · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
The Nature of Necessity
The Principle of Sufficient Reason
On What Matters
Providence and the Problem of Evil
Can God Be Free
A morally unsurpassable God must create the best
Must God Create the Best
The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz
Value and Reality
Existence and the Ontological Argument
Philosophical Explanations
Morality and Religion
The Fine-Tuning Argument
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,25 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |