The Moral Universe
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8109741 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Bengson (0009-0004-8766-2214, The University of Texas at Austin, corresponding author), Terence Cuneo (0000-0002-9850-5490, University of Vermont), Russ Shafer-Landau (University of Wisconsin–Madison), Russ Shafer‐landau |
| Year | 2024 |
| Publication date | 2024-04-30 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | The Moral Universe (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University PressOxford (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/9780198914594.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W4396530904 |
| ISBN | 9780198914594 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 242 |
The Moral Universe develops a metaethical theory that is both realist and nonnaturalist. Employing a distinctive methodology, the book constructs a view designed to capture the idea that moral standards regarding what to do and how to be are not only objectively authoritative, but essentially so. Rather than arising from personal schemes or collective ideals, morality flows from the nature of things. One of the principal aims of the book is to show how this view accommodates and explains a wide range of data concerning the metaphysical and normative dimensions of morality. The discussion is wide-ranging: the authors assemble a set of theses about the character of moral reasons, requirements, values, and fittingness, maintaining that all are constrained by a set of fixed points governing our interpersonal relations. The book falls into four Parts. The first, Foundations, lays out its methodology and offers detailed characterizations of moral realism and nonnaturalism. The second, Metaphysics, investigates ontological questions about moral reality, contending that there is such a thing and that it is objective. The third Part, Normativity, explores the authority of moral considerations, developing a view according to which there are strong moral reasons. Finally, the fourth Part, Moral Essence, builds to a sustained defense of nonnaturalism, by extending and deepening the treatment of the objective authority of morality offered in the previous two Parts
Epistemology · Metaphysics · Moral development · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Moral reasoning · Morality · Normative · Possible world · Principal (computer security · Realism · Set (abstract data type · Social cognitive theory of morality · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · Philosophy · Social Psychology
Morality in a Natural World
Ethical Realism
On What Matters
Unbelievable Errors
Value, Reality, and Desire
In Contradiction
The Normative Web
The Nature of Normativity
Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
Natural Moralities
Being For
The Myth of Morality
How We Get Along
Meaning and Normativity
The Authority of Reason
Ruling Passions
Taking Morality Seriously
The Philosophy of Philosophy
Real Definition
The Varieties of Necessity
Guide to ground
Metaphysical Dependence
Full Information Accounts of Well-Being
The logic of essence
The Strike of the Demon
Facts and Values
Servility and Self-Respect
Constructivism about Reasons
Ii—the Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Unified Foundations for Essence and Ground
Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good
On What Grounds What
There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes
A Logic for ‘Because’
XIV—Ontological Dependence
Fittingness First
A Theory of Justice
Parsimony and the Argument from Queerness
The Possibility of Physicalism
Constructing Protagorean Objectivity1
Skepticism about Practical Reason
Moral Saints
Intuition and Modal Error
Creating Capabilities
How not to be an ethical constructivist
The Disorder of Public Reason
The Necessity of Moral Judgments
‘Conceptual Truth’
Modality and Explanatory Reasoning
The Sources of Normativity
Being Realistic about Reasons
Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action
Writing the Book of the World
Knowing Right From Wrong
Pricean reflection
Full-Information Theories of Individual Good
Alienation and Internal Reasons for Action
Reasons Internalism
Life and Action
Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge
Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge
Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism
Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths
Could Morality Have a Source
The Moral Fixed Points
Slaves of the Passions
Reasons Internalism, Hegelian Resources
Essence and Modality
The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism
The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic
Some Questions About the Justification of Morality
Meta‐Ethics and The Problem of Creeping Minimalism
A platonist epistemology
Carnap and logical truth
Explanatory Depth
Moral Relativism Defended
Grounding, Explanation, and the Limit of Internality
The Authority of Desire
Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics
The Walk and the Talk
Moral Realism
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence
Respecting the Game
Grounding the Unreal
Korsgaard's Private‐Reasons Argument
Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non‐naturalism
Grounding, Essence, and Identity
Finite Beings, Finite Goods
Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer
Main Trends in Recent Philosophy
Production and Necessity
Explanatory Distance
On Defending a Moral Synthetic a Priori 1
Reconciling Realism with Humeanism
Why Idealize
Moral Facts as Configuring Causes
Moral Relativity
The moral fixed points
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |