Skepticism about Practical Reason
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23168608 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christine M Korsgaard (Harvard University Press, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1986 |
| Volume | 83 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 5 |
| Publication date | 1986-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-362X • E-ISSN: 1939-8549 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2026464 |
| OpenAlex | W1562209093 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 158 |
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Skepticism · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy
Direção material do processo
Normative reasons and motivational capacities
Good and Bad Desires
On the Relationship between Science and Ethics
Normative reasons and the possibility of motivation
Defusing counterexamples against motivational internalism
Psychoanalysis, Public Reason, and Reconstruction in the "New" South Africa
The Genesis of Shame
Classical and connectionist models
A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language
What Goes without Saying in Metaethics
Dispositions and Fetishes
External reasons and the foundations of morality
On the Connection between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for those Reasons
Korsgaard on Motivational Skepticism
Reasons First
Morality in a Natural World
Reason in Action
Non‐Teleological Explanations of Actions
Teleological Explanations of Actions
The Inherently Normative Nature of Action Explanations
Practical Reasoning
Explanations in Terms of the Agent's Reasoning
Rational Nature as an End‐In‐Itself
Motivational Humeanism 5
Transition to Human Beings
The Constructivist Challenge 2
The Justification of Moral Principles 11
The Theory of Motivating States
Moral Scepticism 10
Supervenience and Causation 4
Moral Rationalism 8
The Sacrifices of the Innocent
Acting for a Good Reason
Immoralism
Reasons and Desires
Formal Principles and Objective Ends
A Derivation of Consequentialism
Reasons and Beliefs
A Fresh Start?
Rationality and Disagreement 9
As I Believe
Consequential Matters
The (Not So) Imperfect Duty of Beneficence
Reasons for Action
The Justification of Verdictive Beliefs 12
The Motive of Duty
Motivational Judgement Internalism 6
The Non-cognitivist Challenge 1
Reasons Internalism 7
Natural Norms
Respect, Dignity, and the Kingdom of Ends
Appendix
Human Goodness
Conclusion
Happiness and Human Good
Ethical Non-naturalism 3
How Many Explanations?
Der Sinn des Handelns. Esser und Weber
Sentimental Rules
Motivation and agency
The Myth of Morality
Seeing What to Do
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning
Motivation and Practical Reasons
The Self as Narrator
Skepticism About Ought Simpliciter
The Foundation of Norms in Islamic Jurisprudence and Theology
Norms and conventions
The moral demands of affluence
The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant's Moral Philosophy
Morality and Socially Constructed Norms
Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action
Emerging Autonomy
The Moral Skeptic
Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, and Rational Intelligibility
Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement
Humean motivation and Humean rationality
Foregrounding Desire
Reasons as explanations
Reasons Internalism and the Function of Normative Reasons
The Varieties of Moral Improvement, or why Metaethical Constructivism must Explain Moral Progress
The Mirage of Motivation Reason Internalism
Kantian Tunes on a Humean Instrument
Internalism about a person’s good
Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives
Ethics and Practical Reasoning
Practical Reality
Kantian Consequentialism
Value and Context
Moral Animals
Moral Realism
Directing Thought
Suppositional Desires and Rational Choice Under Moral Uncertainty
If this is indoctrination, we are all indoctrinated
Religious Autonomy and the Existential Process of Agency
Reasons for Meaningful Human Control
Motivating Emotions
Moral blame and rational criticism
The disunity of moral judgment
| Unique citing works | 158 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,65 |
| Citation span | 1992 - 2026 (35) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 145 |