Ethical Non-naturalism 3
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23637801 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Russ Shafer-Landau, Russ Shafer‐landau (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Pages | 55-79 |
| Publication date | 2003-06-19 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Moral realism (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University PressOxford (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/0199259755.003.0004 |
| OpenAlex | W2485666374 |
| ISBN | 9780199259755 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 114 |
Defends ethical non‐naturalism. Presents G. E. Moore's open question argument as the basis for drawing a natural/non‐natural divide, and discusses various ways of marking the distinction between the natural and the non‐natural. Includes criticisms of ethical naturalism.
Archaeology · Argument (complex analysis) · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Natural (archaeology) · Naturalism · Chemistry · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Language, truth and logic
Minds, brains, and science
The structure of empirical knowledge
Ethics
Knowledge and the flow of information
Belief, Truth and Knowledge
Moral Perception and Particularity
The Theory of Epistemic Rationality
Moral Thinking
Warrant and Proper Function
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
Warrant
Virtues of the Mind
Knowledge in Perspective
The Authority of Reason
How to Define Theoretical Terms
Full Information Accounts of Well-Being
Facts and Values
Naming and Necessity
Positivism and Fidelity to Law
Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good
Concepts of Epistemic Justification
There is No Question of Physicalism
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals
The Generality Problem for Reliabilism
Direction of Fit
Putting Skeptics in their Place
Moral judgement and normative reasons
Realism and Reason
Mind, Language and Reality
Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge
Skepticism about Practical Reason
Just causes
Creating the Kingdom of Ends
Reliability and Justification
Moral Luck
Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life
I – Derek Parfit
Moral Rules
The Humean Theory of Motivation
Virtue and Reason
The Sources of Normativity
Internalism About Reasons for Action
Full-Information Theories of Individual Good
Making sense of humanity and other philosophical papers, 1982-1993
Some Questions About the Justification of Morality
Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function
Troubles on moral twin earth
Special sciences (or
Assertion
Moral Relativism Defended
Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character
"Brandt's Definition of "Good
Ascriptivism
Toward Fin de siecle Ethics
Expressivism and Irrationality
Ways of Moral Learning
The Authority of Desire
Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics
Moral Realism
Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation
The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind
Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction
Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer
The Expressivist Circle
Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism and Moral Indeterminacy
The Sorites Paradox
Moral Realities
Moral Explanations of Natural Facts—can Moral Claims Be Tested Against Moral Reality
Non-Cognitivism, Truth and Logic
Moral Relativity
Moral Relevance and Ceteris Paribus Principles
Supervenience and Moral Realism
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
Natural Goodness
Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory
Morality, Normativity, and Society
Balance and Refinement
Philosophical Explanations
Objectivity and Truth
Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation
Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem
Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |