Could we have experiences as of objects enduring

Bibliographic Data

ID10344381
AuthorsKristie Miller (0000-0002-5092-8419, The University of Sydney, corresponding author)
Year2025
Publication date2025-08-28
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaf069
OpenAlexW4413803902
LanguageEN
References cited65

It is often suggested that we have experiences as of objects enduring. If this is a claim about perceptual experience, it is unclear how it could be true. It seems plausible that however objects persist, we would receive the same inputs to perception. Hence, things would seem experientially the same regardless of whether objects endure, or persist in some other manner. So, it cannot be that in any interesting sense we have experiences as of objects enduring. My aim is the modest one of articulating how, despite this, we could have perceptual experiences as of objects enduring. I then argue that even if we do, it does not give us any reason to infer, on the basis of these experiences, that objects endure

Aesthetics · Epistemology · Action Observation and Synchronization · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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