A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10344403 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christian List (0000-0003-1627-800X, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1026-1048 |
| Publication date | 2024-06-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqae053 |
| OpenAlex | W4399303266 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 17 |
In this paper, I argue that no theory of consciousness can simultaneously respect four initially plausible metaphysical claims—namely ‘first-person realism’, ‘non-solipsism’, ‘non-fragmentation’, and ‘one world’—but that any three of the four claims are mutually consistent. So, theories of consciousness face a ‘quadrilemma’. Since it will be hard to achieve a consensus on which of the four claims to retain and which to give up, we arrive at a landscape of competing theories, all of which have pros and cons. I will briefly indicate which kinds of theories correspond to the four horns of the quadrilemma
Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |