The many‐worlds theory of consciousness

Bibliographic Data

ID21364094
AuthorsChristian List (0000-0003-1627-800X, LMU Munich Munchen Germany, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume57
Issue2
Pages316-340
Publication date2023-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueNoûs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12408
OpenAlexW3015568360
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited29

This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many‐worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first‐personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first‐personal realizers” of a shared “third‐personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first‐personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness

Consciousness · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Ontology · Possible world · Sociology · Solipsism · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Quantum Mechanics and Applications

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