Bearers of Value
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345154 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ramon M Lemos (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 873-873 |
| Publication date | 1991-12-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2108186 |
| OpenAlex | W2321028697 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
In what follows I discuss a topic that has not received as much attention in recent years as it once did. This is issue of ontological categories of bearers of intrinsic value. To use language of Meinong, without necessarily attaching to it precisely same meaning he did, such categories are species of either of two genera-objects and objectives. The categories of universals and particulars are species of objects. W. D. Ross identifies objectives with facts, and suggests that the things that have ultimate value are facts.' But, as will appear, term fact has different senses, to distinguish between which it is necessary to distinguish between states of affairs, obtaining and non-obtaining of states of affairs, and propositions, each of which I shall take to be a species of objectives. The central question I shall address is that of which of these categories of objects and objectives are bearers of intrinsic value and which are not. I shall assume that for purposes of this paper distinction I intend between two species of objects-universals and particulars-will be sufficiently clear.2 The argument, however, will require a short ontological excursion concerning nature of various species of objectives and their relationships to one another
Statistics · Value (mathematics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Mathematics · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 0.09 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2003 - 2022 (20) |
| Highly cited | No |