Epistemicism and commensurability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21334932 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul Forrester (0000-0002-9668-5512, Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Pages | 1-34 |
| Publication date | 2022-12-20 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2022.2155870 |
| OpenAlex | W4313449209 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 18 |
The topic for this paper is the phenomenon of apparent value incommensurability—two goods are apparently incommensurable when it appears that neither is better than the other nor are they equally good. I shall consider three theories of this phenomenon. Indeterminists like Broome (1997) hold that the phenomenon is due to vagueness: when two goods appear to be incommensurable, this owes to the fact that “better than” is vague. Incommensurabilists like Chang (2002) hold that some goods appear to be incommensurable because they genuinely are, because it is determinately the case than neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good. I defend epistemicism, the view that the appearance of value incommensurability is due only to our ignorance of how goods compare. In reality, all goods are commensurable. I offer two arguments for epistemicism and against other views. First, epistemicists are committed to less unexplained axiological structure than are non-epistemicists, who must explain the extra structure that they posit. Second, only epistemicists have an adequate explanation of some facts about the scope of apparent incommensurability. Finally, I identify a class of putative counterexamples to the epistemicist’s analysis, and argue that these counterexamples do not succeed. If my arguments are sound, then, we have very good reason to think that for any two things that are good, either one is (determinately) better than the other, or they are (determinately) equally good
Combinatorics · Commensurability (mathematics) · Counterexample · Epistemology · Ignorance · Linguistics · Phenomenon · Pure mathematics · Sociology · Vagueness · Value (mathematics) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Value Comparability
The Possibility of Parity
Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion
Well-being
A More Plausible Collapsing Principle
Indeterminacy and the Small-Improvement Argument
Broome's Argument against Value Incomparability
Borderline Cases and the Collapsing Principle
Bearers of Value
Value Relations
Conflicting Reasons in the Small-Improvement Argument
| Highly cited | No |
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