Neo‐pragmatism, Representationalism and the Emotions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345733 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joshua Gert (0000-0002-0886-9785, The College of William and Mary, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 97 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 454-478 |
| Publication date | 2017-02-28 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12373 |
| OpenAlex | W2593388965 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 31 |
This paper offers a neo‐pragmatist account of the representational character of the emotions, for those emotions that have such a character. Put most generally, neo‐pragmatism is the view that language should not be conceived primarily in terms of a robust relation of reference to or representation of antecedently given objects and properties. Rather, we should view it as a social practice that lets us do various quite different sorts of things. One of those things might be called ‘assessing representational accuracy’, but this need not be thought of in terms of a metaphysically heavyweight relation. In applying neo‐pragmatist techniques to the domain of the emotions, the result will be an alternative to currently popular accounts that individuate emotions partly in terms of what they represent. This alternative continues to allow us to use representational language in connection with some emotions. And it also helps to explain the awkwardness of representational talk in connection with other emotions: an awkwardness that was always a liability of monolithic representationalist views
Character (mathematics · Cognitive science · Direct and indirect realism · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Political science · Pragmatism · Realism · Relation (database · Representation (politics · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology
Emotion
Between Saying and Doing
What Emotions Really Are
Ruling Passions
The Nature of Emotions
Social Functions of Emotions at Four Levels of Analysis
The Strike of the Demon
Emotions as Attitudes
Functional Accounts of Emotions
Ii.—what Is an Emotion ?
The Nature of Emotions
Perception, Knowledge and Belief
Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism
Evolution and Social Psychology
Intentionalism Defended
The Moralistic Fallacy
Prinz’s Theory of Emotion 1
Moral Fictionalism
Intentionality
Emotions are social
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,6 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2022 (2) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |