Joshua Gert
Biographic Data
| ID | 952411 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joshua Gert |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joshua |
| FAMILY NAME | Gert |
| SIGNATURE | GERT J |
| AFFILIATIONS | William & Mary |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0886-9785 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 24 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 32 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 24 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Naturalism, Normativity, and Neopragmatism
Neopragmatism is what local expressivism becomes when it is fully generalized and globalized. One of its attractions is its promise to demystify long-standing metaphysical puzzles by shifting the focus from ontology to language. Among current neopragmatists, there is an important divide. Members of one group hold that we cannot explain language without making use of normative notions such as reasons or entitlements. Members of the other group den…
Naturalistic Neopragmatism and Conceptual Connections
Neopragmatists – some of whom might be called ‘global expressivists’ – reject metaphysics and take talk of concepts to be talk of the mastery of contingent linguistic practices that have been shaped by human nature. As a result, it may seem much harder for them to account for the sorts of necessary connections – whether conceptual or metaphysical – defended in so much of contemporary analytic philosophy. In some cases, this is right: the connecti…
Easy ontology made a little less easy
In Rethinking Metaphysics Amie Thomasson begins with a diagnosis of the characteristic error that leads philosophers to conduct mainstream metaphysics in traditional ways. The source of the problem is a mistaken picture of how language works. She then defends a reconceptualization of at least many traditional metaphysical debates, turning them into attempts at conceptual engineering (or, in some cases, reverse-engineering). In this paper, and des…
Neopragmatism as a solution to Twin Earth problems
Adverbialism and objects
Information-Theoretic Adverbialism
Adverbialism is the view that to have a conscious perceptual experience is to be consciously experiencing in a certain way, and that this way is not to be understood in relational or representational terms. We might compare what it is for a conscious being to be experiencing in a certain way with what it is for a string to be vibrating in a certain way. This paper makes a new case for adverbialism by appealing to the fact that we can pick out way…
Transparency, representationalism, and visual noise
Neopragmatist semantics
Neo‐pragmatism, Representationalism and the Emotions
This paper offers a neo‐pragmatist account of the representational character of the emotions, for those emotions that have such a character. Put most generally, neo‐pragmatism is the view that language should not be conceived primarily in terms of a robust relation of reference to or representation of antecedently given objects and properties. Rather, we should view it as a social practice that lets us do various quite different sorts of things. …
Outside Color from Just Outside
Chirimuuta's view and my own are as close as they are because we both take two quite controversial stances: pragmatism as against a correspondence‐based view of perceptual success, and adverbialism as against a representational view of color experience. Unsurprisingly, of course, we do not understand these positions in precisely the same ways. In these comments I would like to see if I can persuade Chirimuuta to take two steps in my direction. Th…
The Distinction between Justifying and Requiring: Nothing to Fear
Parity, Preference and Puzzlement
R uth C hang has argued for the existence of a fourth positive value relation, distinct from betterness, worseness and equality, which she calls “parity.” In an earlier article I seemed to criticize C hang's suggestion by offering an interval model for the values of items that I claimed could accommodate all the phenomena characteristic of parity. W lodek R abinowicz, offering his own model of value relations, endorsed one central feature of my p…
Perform a Justified Option
In a number of recent publications, Douglas Portmore has defended consequentialism, largely on the basis of a maximizing view of practical rationality. I have criticized such maximizing views, arguing that we need to distinguish two independent dimensions of normative strength: justifying strength and requiring strength. I have also argued that this distinction helps to explain why we typically have so many rational options. Engaging with these a…
Moral Rationalism and Commonsense Consequentialism
Moral Worth, Supererogation, and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction
Julia Markovits has recently argued for what she calls the ‘Coincident Reasons Thesis’: the thesis that one’s action is morally worthy if and only if one’s motivating reasons for acting mirror, in content and strength, the reasons that explain why the action ought, morally, to be performed. This thesis assumes that the structure of motivating reasons is sufficiently similar to the structure of normative reasons that the required coincidence in co…
Response‐Dependence and Normative Bedrock
Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays in Moral Psychology and Practical Reason – R. Jay Wallace
In Normativity and the Will R. Jay Wallace brings together an impressive collection of fourteen essays, thirteen of which have been previously published, beginning with his 1990 paper ‘How to Argue about Practical Reason’. These essays, along with a useful introduction, are organized into three general topics: the relation between normativity and motivation, where issues in the theory of practical reason take centre stage; moral responsibility an…
Neo-Sentimentalism and Disgust
Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons
Research Article| October 01 2007 Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons Joshua Gert Joshua Gert Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 533–562. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-013 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Joshua Gert; Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons. The Philosophical Review 1 October 20…
Problems for Moral Twin Earth Arguments
Lenman on externalism and amoralism: An interplanetary exploration
Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action
Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy
Over‐simple internalist accounts of practical reasons imply that we cannot have reasons to become more rational, because they claim that we have a reason to φ only if we would have some desire to φ if we were fully rational. But if we were fully rational, we would have no desire to become more rational. Robert Johnson has recently argued that in their attempts to avoid this problem, existing versions of internalism yield reasons which do not have…
Korsgaard's Private‐Reasons Argument
In The Sources of Normativity , Christine Korsgaard presents and defends a neo‐Kantian theory of normativity. Her initial account of reasons seems to make them dependent upon the practical identity of the agent, and upon the value the agent must place on her own humanity. This seems to make all reasons agent‐relative. But Korsgaard claims that arguments similar to Wittgenstein's private‐language argument can show that reasons are in fact essentia…
Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons
Research Article| October 01 2007 Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons Joshua Gert Joshua Gert Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 533–562. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-013 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Joshua Gert; Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons. The Philosophical Review 1 October 20…
Korsgaard's Private‐Reasons Argument
In The Sources of Normativity , Christine Korsgaard presents and defends a neo‐Kantian theory of normativity. Her initial account of reasons seems to make them dependent upon the practical identity of the agent, and upon the value the agent must place on her own humanity. This seems to make all reasons agent‐relative. But Korsgaard claims that arguments similar to Wittgenstein's private‐language argument can show that reasons are in fact essentia…
Neopragmatist semantics
Neo‐pragmatism, Representationalism and the Emotions
This paper offers a neo‐pragmatist account of the representational character of the emotions, for those emotions that have such a character. Put most generally, neo‐pragmatism is the view that language should not be conceived primarily in terms of a robust relation of reference to or representation of antecedently given objects and properties. Rather, we should view it as a social practice that lets us do various quite different sorts of things. …
Lenman on externalism and amoralism: An interplanetary exploration
Perform a Justified Option
In a number of recent publications, Douglas Portmore has defended consequentialism, largely on the basis of a maximizing view of practical rationality. I have criticized such maximizing views, arguing that we need to distinguish two independent dimensions of normative strength: justifying strength and requiring strength. I have also argued that this distinction helps to explain why we typically have so many rational options. Engaging with these a…
Moral Worth, Supererogation, and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction
Julia Markovits has recently argued for what she calls the ‘Coincident Reasons Thesis’: the thesis that one’s action is morally worthy if and only if one’s motivating reasons for acting mirror, in content and strength, the reasons that explain why the action ought, morally, to be performed. This thesis assumes that the structure of motivating reasons is sufficiently similar to the structure of normative reasons that the required coincidence in co…
Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy
Over‐simple internalist accounts of practical reasons imply that we cannot have reasons to become more rational, because they claim that we have a reason to φ only if we would have some desire to φ if we were fully rational. But if we were fully rational, we would have no desire to become more rational. Robert Johnson has recently argued that in their attempts to avoid this problem, existing versions of internalism yield reasons which do not have…
Korsgaard's Private‐Reasons Argument
In The Sources of Normativity , Christine Korsgaard presents and defends a neo‐Kantian theory of normativity. Her initial account of reasons seems to make them dependent upon the practical identity of the agent, and upon the value the agent must place on her own humanity. This seems to make all reasons agent‐relative. But Korsgaard claims that arguments similar to Wittgenstein's private‐language argument can show that reasons are in fact essentia…
Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action
Lenman on externalism and amoralism: An interplanetary exploration
Problems for Moral Twin Earth Arguments
Neo-Sentimentalism and Disgust
Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons
Research Article| October 01 2007 Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons Joshua Gert Joshua Gert Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 533–562. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-013 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Joshua Gert; Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons. The Philosophical Review 1 October 20…
Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays in Moral Psychology and Practical Reason – R. Jay Wallace
In Normativity and the Will R. Jay Wallace brings together an impressive collection of fourteen essays, thirteen of which have been previously published, beginning with his 1990 paper ‘How to Argue about Practical Reason’. These essays, along with a useful introduction, are organized into three general topics: the relation between normativity and motivation, where issues in the theory of practical reason take centre stage; moral responsibility an…
Response‐Dependence and Normative Bedrock
Moral Worth, Supererogation, and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction
Julia Markovits has recently argued for what she calls the ‘Coincident Reasons Thesis’: the thesis that one’s action is morally worthy if and only if one’s motivating reasons for acting mirror, in content and strength, the reasons that explain why the action ought, morally, to be performed. This thesis assumes that the structure of motivating reasons is sufficiently similar to the structure of normative reasons that the required coincidence in co…
Perform a Justified Option
In a number of recent publications, Douglas Portmore has defended consequentialism, largely on the basis of a maximizing view of practical rationality. I have criticized such maximizing views, arguing that we need to distinguish two independent dimensions of normative strength: justifying strength and requiring strength. I have also argued that this distinction helps to explain why we typically have so many rational options. Engaging with these a…
Moral Rationalism and Commonsense Consequentialism
Parity, Preference and Puzzlement
R uth C hang has argued for the existence of a fourth positive value relation, distinct from betterness, worseness and equality, which she calls “parity.” In an earlier article I seemed to criticize C hang's suggestion by offering an interval model for the values of items that I claimed could accommodate all the phenomena characteristic of parity. W lodek R abinowicz, offering his own model of value relations, endorsed one central feature of my p…
The Distinction between Justifying and Requiring: Nothing to Fear
Neo‐pragmatism, Representationalism and the Emotions
This paper offers a neo‐pragmatist account of the representational character of the emotions, for those emotions that have such a character. Put most generally, neo‐pragmatism is the view that language should not be conceived primarily in terms of a robust relation of reference to or representation of antecedently given objects and properties. Rather, we should view it as a social practice that lets us do various quite different sorts of things. …
Outside Color from Just Outside
Chirimuuta's view and my own are as close as they are because we both take two quite controversial stances: pragmatism as against a correspondence‐based view of perceptual success, and adverbialism as against a representational view of color experience. Unsurprisingly, of course, we do not understand these positions in precisely the same ways. In these comments I would like to see if I can persuade Chirimuuta to take two steps in my direction. Th…
Information-Theoretic Adverbialism
Adverbialism is the view that to have a conscious perceptual experience is to be consciously experiencing in a certain way, and that this way is not to be understood in relational or representational terms. We might compare what it is for a conscious being to be experiencing in a certain way with what it is for a string to be vibrating in a certain way. This paper makes a new case for adverbialism by appealing to the fact that we can pick out way…
Transparency, representationalism, and visual noise
Neopragmatist semantics
Adverbialism and objects
Neopragmatism as a solution to Twin Earth problems
Naturalistic Neopragmatism and Conceptual Connections
Neopragmatists – some of whom might be called ‘global expressivists’ – reject metaphysics and take talk of concepts to be talk of the mastery of contingent linguistic practices that have been shaped by human nature. As a result, it may seem much harder for them to account for the sorts of necessary connections – whether conceptual or metaphysical – defended in so much of contemporary analytic philosophy. In some cases, this is right: the connecti…
Easy ontology made a little less easy
In Rethinking Metaphysics Amie Thomasson begins with a diagnosis of the characteristic error that leads philosophers to conduct mainstream metaphysics in traditional ways. The source of the problem is a mistaken picture of how language works. She then defends a reconceptualization of at least many traditional metaphysical debates, turning them into attempts at conceptual engineering (or, in some cases, reverse-engineering). In this paper, and des…
Naturalism, Normativity, and Neopragmatism
Neopragmatism is what local expressivism becomes when it is fully generalized and globalized. One of its attractions is its promise to demystify long-standing metaphysical puzzles by shifting the focus from ontology to language. Among current neopragmatists, there is an important divide. Members of one group hold that we cannot explain language without making use of normative notions such as reasons or entitlements. Members of the other group den…
Philosophy (20 works) · Epistemology (19 works) · Computer Science (12 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (12 works) · Psychology (12 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (11 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Metaphysics (8 works) · Normative (8 works) · Philosophy of language (7 works)