Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10690581 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joshua Gert (0000-0002-0886-9785, University of Missouri, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 206 |
| Pages | 88-95 |
| Publication date | 2002-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00255 |
| OpenAlex | W2044648081 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 7 |
Over‐simple internalist accounts of practical reasons imply that we cannot have reasons to become more rational, because they claim that we have a reason to φ only if we would have some desire to φ if we were fully rational. But if we were fully rational, we would have no desire to become more rational. Robert Johnson has recently argued that in their attempts to avoid this problem, existing versions of internalism yield reasons which do not have an appropriate connection with potential explanations of action. I suggest that the problem is partly a result of failure to see that action‐tokens are usually tokens of a wide variety of action‐types, and that the internalist conditional need only be true of one of these types in order to justify a reason claim about the token
Action (physics) · Epistemology · Externalism · Fallacy · Internalism and externalism · Rationality · Simple (philosophy) · Variety (cybernetics) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |