Making it Implicit
Brandom on Rule Following
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345775 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anandi Hattiangadi (0000-0002-3061-6143, Trinity College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 419-431 |
| Publication date | 2003-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00269.x |
| OpenAlex | W2094675235 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
In Making it Explicit , Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommodates its normativity—a requirement on theories of content that Brandom traces to Wittgenstein's rule following considerations. It is widely held that the normativity requirement cannot be met, or at least not with ease, because theories of content face an intractable dilemma. Brandom proposes to evade the dilemma by adopting a middle road—one that uses normative vocabulary, but treats norms as implicit in practices. I argue that this proposal fails to evade the dilemma, as Brandom himself understands it. Despite his use of normative vocabulary, Brandom's theory fares no better than the reductionist theories he criticises. I consider some responses that Brandom might make to my charges, and finally conclude that his proposal founders on his own criteria
Content (measure theory · Dilemma · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept · Irreducibility · Linguistics · Normative · Reductionism · Vocabulary · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.38 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2023 (19) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |