Anandi Hattiangadi
Biographic Data
| ID | 1132299 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anandi Hattiangadi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anandi |
| FAMILY NAME | Hattiangadi |
| SIGNATURE | HATTIANGADI A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stockholm University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3061-6143 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 41 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The emergence of polarised groups through source filtering
Polarisation is a widespread societal issue, dividing populations into opposing groups whose beliefs may span multiple, seemingly unrelated, topics. This phenomenon creates distinct cultural groups with internally consistent yet mutually opposing beliefs, strengthening group identities and deepening societal divides. We develop a mathematical model to investigate how polarisation and emergent associations between unrelated beliefs occur. Unlike p…
A joint future for cultural evolution and developmental psychology
Developmental psychology and cultural evolution are concerned with the same research questions but rarely interact. Collaboration between these fields could lead to substantial progress. Developmental psychology and related fields such as educational science and linguistics explore how behavior and cognition develop through combinations of social and individual experiences and efforts. Human developmental processes display remarkable plasticity, …
Can truth relativism account for the indeterminacy of future contingents
John MacFarlane has recently argued that his brand of truth relativism provides the best solution to the puzzle of future contingents: assertions about the future that express propositions that are metaphysically neither necessary nor impossible. In this paper, we show that even if we grant all of the metaphysical, semantic and pragmatic assumptions in terms of which MacFarlane sets and aims to solve the puzzle, his truth relativism is not apt to…
Radical interpretation and decision theory
This paper takes issue with an influential interpretationist argument for physicalism about intentionality based on the possibility of radical interpretation. The interpretationist defends the physicalist thesis that the intentional truths supervene on the physical truths by arguing that it is possible for a radical interpreter, who knows all of the physical truths, to work out the intentional truths about what an arbitrary agent believes, desire…
Radical Interpretation and The Aggregation Problem
This paper takes issue with Lewis’ influential argument for the supervenience of the semantic on the non‐semantic based on the possibility of radical interpretation. Radical interpretation is possible only if an ideal being, who is omniscient about the non‐semantic truths, can deduce the semantic truths a priori. The radical interpreter appeals to a set of criteria of interpretation choice, such as most notably some kind of Principle of Charity. …
The love of truth
Reductionism
Anti‐Reductionism
This chapter considers anti-reductionist theories and argues that each of those also fails. Anti-reductionists — who maintain that there are semantic facts over and above the causal, physical, and functional facts — seem equally unable to determine uniquely that I mean chicken pox rather than schicken pox by ‘chicken pox’. The problems that beset reductionists and anti-reductionists are different, but yield the same, unfortunate result.
Norms and Normativity
This chapter lays out the meta-ethical arguments and assumptions Kripke would need to make in order to remove the gaps in the sceptical argument as he presents it. It considers a more detailed account of the thesis that meaning is normative and its role in the sceptical argument. It argues that the assumption that meaning is normative does not follow directly from semantic realism, but from the assumption that understanding the meaning of a word …
The Sceptical Argument
Can we do Without Semantic Facts?
This chapter explores Kripke's sceptical solution. Supposing that the sceptical argument is sound, what prospect is there for a sceptical solution, in other words one that embraces the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter to what we mean? It is argued that the ‘no fact thesis’ is irremediably incoherent, since, if semantic realism is rejected, no statement can be true or justified, even in the weakest sense. Thus, there is no hope for a…
Conclusion
This concluding chapter synthesizes the arguments presented in the preceding chapters. It is argued that although we may not yet have an adequate theory of representation, we have no reason to believe that none will be forthcoming. The incoherence of the sceptical conclusion gives us some reason to believe that a fully adequate theory of intentionality will be forthcoming.
Is Meaning Normative?
This chapter argues that the sceptic goes wrong in assuming that meaning is normative. By considering and rejecting all of the most compelling reasons one might have for believing Normativity, it is argued that it is untenable. Since it is Normativity but not Norm-Relativity that engages the meta-ethical arguments against meaning facts, by rejecting Normativity, it is shown that the sceptic's only hope of a wide-ranging a priori argument against …
Oughts and Thoughts
Anandi Hattiangadi provides an innovative response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Is Meaning Normative
Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that…
Making it Implicit
In Making it Explicit , Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommodates its normativity—a requirement on theories of content that Brandom traces to Wittgenstein's rule following considerations. It is widely held that the normativity requirement cannot be met, or at least not with ease, because theories of content face an intractable dilemma. Brandom proposes to evade the dilemma by adopting a middle road—one that use…
[email protected]
Oughts and Thoughts
Anandi Hattiangadi provides an innovative response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Is Meaning Normative
Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that…
Making it Implicit
In Making it Explicit , Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommodates its normativity—a requirement on theories of content that Brandom traces to Wittgenstein's rule following considerations. It is widely held that the normativity requirement cannot be met, or at least not with ease, because theories of content face an intractable dilemma. Brandom proposes to evade the dilemma by adopting a middle road—one that use…
Radical Interpretation and The Aggregation Problem
This paper takes issue with Lewis’ influential argument for the supervenience of the semantic on the non‐semantic based on the possibility of radical interpretation. Radical interpretation is possible only if an ideal being, who is omniscient about the non‐semantic truths, can deduce the semantic truths a priori. The radical interpreter appeals to a set of criteria of interpretation choice, such as most notably some kind of Principle of Charity. …
The love of truth
[email protected]
Making it Implicit
In Making it Explicit , Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommodates its normativity—a requirement on theories of content that Brandom traces to Wittgenstein's rule following considerations. It is widely held that the normativity requirement cannot be met, or at least not with ease, because theories of content face an intractable dilemma. Brandom proposes to evade the dilemma by adopting a middle road—one that use…
Is Meaning Normative
Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that…
Reductionism
Anti‐Reductionism
This chapter considers anti-reductionist theories and argues that each of those also fails. Anti-reductionists — who maintain that there are semantic facts over and above the causal, physical, and functional facts — seem equally unable to determine uniquely that I mean chicken pox rather than schicken pox by ‘chicken pox’. The problems that beset reductionists and anti-reductionists are different, but yield the same, unfortunate result.
Norms and Normativity
This chapter lays out the meta-ethical arguments and assumptions Kripke would need to make in order to remove the gaps in the sceptical argument as he presents it. It considers a more detailed account of the thesis that meaning is normative and its role in the sceptical argument. It argues that the assumption that meaning is normative does not follow directly from semantic realism, but from the assumption that understanding the meaning of a word …
The Sceptical Argument
Can we do Without Semantic Facts?
This chapter explores Kripke's sceptical solution. Supposing that the sceptical argument is sound, what prospect is there for a sceptical solution, in other words one that embraces the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter to what we mean? It is argued that the ‘no fact thesis’ is irremediably incoherent, since, if semantic realism is rejected, no statement can be true or justified, even in the weakest sense. Thus, there is no hope for a…
Conclusion
This concluding chapter synthesizes the arguments presented in the preceding chapters. It is argued that although we may not yet have an adequate theory of representation, we have no reason to believe that none will be forthcoming. The incoherence of the sceptical conclusion gives us some reason to believe that a fully adequate theory of intentionality will be forthcoming.
Is Meaning Normative?
This chapter argues that the sceptic goes wrong in assuming that meaning is normative. By considering and rejecting all of the most compelling reasons one might have for believing Normativity, it is argued that it is untenable. Since it is Normativity but not Norm-Relativity that engages the meta-ethical arguments against meaning facts, by rejecting Normativity, it is shown that the sceptic's only hope of a wide-ranging a priori argument against …
Oughts and Thoughts
Anandi Hattiangadi provides an innovative response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
The love of truth
Radical Interpretation and The Aggregation Problem
This paper takes issue with Lewis’ influential argument for the supervenience of the semantic on the non‐semantic based on the possibility of radical interpretation. Radical interpretation is possible only if an ideal being, who is omniscient about the non‐semantic truths, can deduce the semantic truths a priori. The radical interpreter appeals to a set of criteria of interpretation choice, such as most notably some kind of Principle of Charity. …
Radical interpretation and decision theory
This paper takes issue with an influential interpretationist argument for physicalism about intentionality based on the possibility of radical interpretation. The interpretationist defends the physicalist thesis that the intentional truths supervene on the physical truths by arguing that it is possible for a radical interpreter, who knows all of the physical truths, to work out the intentional truths about what an arbitrary agent believes, desire…
Can truth relativism account for the indeterminacy of future contingents
John MacFarlane has recently argued that his brand of truth relativism provides the best solution to the puzzle of future contingents: assertions about the future that express propositions that are metaphysically neither necessary nor impossible. In this paper, we show that even if we grant all of the metaphysical, semantic and pragmatic assumptions in terms of which MacFarlane sets and aims to solve the puzzle, his truth relativism is not apt to…
A joint future for cultural evolution and developmental psychology
Developmental psychology and cultural evolution are concerned with the same research questions but rarely interact. Collaboration between these fields could lead to substantial progress. Developmental psychology and related fields such as educational science and linguistics explore how behavior and cognition develop through combinations of social and individual experiences and efforts. Human developmental processes display remarkable plasticity, …
The emergence of polarised groups through source filtering
Polarisation is a widespread societal issue, dividing populations into opposing groups whose beliefs may span multiple, seemingly unrelated, topics. This phenomenon creates distinct cultural groups with internally consistent yet mutually opposing beliefs, strengthening group identities and deepening societal divides. We develop a mathematical model to investigate how polarisation and emergent associations between unrelated beliefs occur. Unlike p…
Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophy (13 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (5 works) · Skepticism (5 works) · Normative (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Political science (4 works)