Can truth relativism account for the indeterminacy of future contingents
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10807641 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Corine Besson (University of Sussex), Anandi Hattiangadi (0000-0002-3061-6143, Stockholm University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 200 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Publication date | 2022-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-022-03549-6 |
| OpenAlex | W4280608380 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 17 |
John MacFarlane has recently argued that his brand of truth relativism provides the best solution to the puzzle of future contingents: assertions about the future that express propositions that are metaphysically neither necessary nor impossible. In this paper, we show that even if we grant all of the metaphysical, semantic and pragmatic assumptions in terms of which MacFarlane sets and aims to solve the puzzle, his truth relativism is not apt to solve the problem of future contingents. We argue that the theory fails to vindicate the intuition that future contingent propositions are neither true nor false, leaving the theory open to a charge of Reductio . We show that these problems cannot be answered while preserving the core tenets of truth relativism
Epistemology · Indeterminacy (philosophy) · Intuition · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Reductio ad absurdum · Relativism · Semantic theory of truth · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |