An Argument against the Causal Theory of Action Explanation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10347455 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Scott Sehon (0000-0002-9466-2296, corresponding author), Scott R Sehon |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 67-67 |
| Publication date | 2000-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2653428 |
| OpenAlex | W2326115169 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
It is widely held that belief explanations of action are a species of causal explanation. This paper argues against the causal construal of action explanation. It first defends the claim that unless beliefs are brain states, beliefs cannot causally explain behavior. Second, the paper argues against the view that beliefs are brain states. It follows from these claims that beliefs do not causally explain behavior. An alternative account is then proposed, according to which action explanation is teleological rather than causal, and the paper closes by suggesting that teleological account makes sense of and supports the autonomy of common sense psychology
Action (physics · Argument (complex analysis · Causal theory of reference · Epistemology · Physics · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citations per year | 0.22 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2003 - 2025 (23) |
| Highly cited | No |