Why are people often rational? Saving the causal theory of action
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21702862 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mihnea Capraru (0000-0001-6985-0183, Nazarbayev University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 68-84 |
| Publication date | 2025-01-02 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Explorations (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13869795.2024.2446201 |
| OpenAlex | W4405912169 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 32 |
Since Donald Davidson issued his challenge to anticausalism in 1963, most philosophers have espoused the view that our actions are causally explained by the reasons why we do them. This Davidsonian consensus, however, rests on a faulty argument. Davidson’s challenge has been met, in more than one way, by anticausalists such as C. Ginet, G. Wilson, and S. Sehon. Hence I endeavor to support causalism with a stronger argument. Our actions are correlated with our motivating reasons; to wit, we often do what we have reason to do. In yet other words, we are often rational. Our frequent rationality is easily explained if causalism is correct, but looks like a staggering coincidence otherwise. Anticausalism thus appears to be ill-equipped to account for the very existence of rational behavior, and so far no attempts in this direction have succeeded
Coincidence · Economics · Epistemology · Positive economics · Rationality · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
The intentionality of human action
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories
Physical Causation
Causality
Causation, Prediction, and Search
Causation
The Direction of Time
Psychological Predicates
Causality and Properties
An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
Essays on Freedom of Action (Routledge Revivals)
Life and Action
Reasons Explanation of Action
Reasons explanations (of actions) as structural explanations
Special sciences (or
On the grammar of ?cause
Studies in the Logic of Explanation
An Argument against the Causal Theory of Action Explanation
Actions, Reasons, and Causes
| Highly cited | No |
|---|