Replies to Stroud, Thomson, and Crisp

I am grateful to Stroud for the clarity with which she presents the argumentative strategy of my book, and for the sympathy she expresses for my approach. But she also raises some important and difficult questions. To begin with, she points out that we must be careful not to infer from the fact that to the conclusion that As she notes, this simple point makes it difficult or impossible to show decisively, by means of examples, that goodness is never a reason. Take a case I use in my book: when we are deliberate about whether to go to the museum this afternoon, it seems relevant to ask whether doing so will be good for us (instrumentally or non-instrumentally), but we do not find ourselves asking whether, in addition, our visit to the museum would be good (period). Stroud's point is that even if I am right about this particular case, the explanation may simply be that these are circumstances in which absolute goodness is not a reason. It does not follow that absolute goodness is never a reason. The point can be iterated: any example will have the same weakness. My response is that it is in general difficult to show decisively that something thought to exist does not in fact exist. Negative existential claims cannot be proved by producing or pointing to the subject of such claims. What we have to do to support them is to look in all of the places where we are likely to find the subject that is alleged to exist; if we do not find what we are searching for, we have reason to be doubtful that it is anywhere to be found. Similarly, if the goodness of a state of affairs sometimes counts in favor of producing it, wishing for it, or valuing it in some other way, then we should be able to answer the question, “In what circumstances does it do so?” And if we look for many circumstances in which we might expect to find goodness as a reason-giving consideration, and always fail, then we have done all that can reasonably be expected to cast doubt on its being a reason. I do not think Stroud and I are at odds about this point. She proposes, however, that one of the examples I use may depend for its force on the peculiarities of the circumstances envisaged. Imagine a mother who teaches her son mathematics even though it will not be good for him to learn it. (He is temperamentally ill suited to the subject and finds it boring, even though he is mathematically talented. His real love is some other subject.) Her motive is to serve mathematics, not her son. Her idea is that this branch of knowledge needs to be kept alive by being learned by a sizable enough audience, and she is willing to sacrifice her son's well-being for the sake of this noble cause. My claim is that here we have a case in which the category of absolute value is put to a pernicious use. She justifies what she is doing by saying, “It is a good thing for mathematics to be studied. It need not be good for anyone.” Stroud agrees with me that this attempt to justify her educational program does not get off the ground. The alleged absolute goodness of learning mathematics is not a reason for this parent to teach her son this subject. But Stroud suggests that the explanation lies in the fact that a parent ought to set aside absolute goodness when she is educating her children, and ought to think entirely in terms of their well-being. It does not follow that learning mathematics is not good (period), nor that its goodness is not a reason for studying it. Perhaps her idea could be developed along these lines: it may be that the absolute goodness of mathematics is one reason in favor of teaching oneself the subject (even at some cost to one's well-being). The parent in my example should not teach the subject to her child (because she is obliged to consider only her son's well-being), but the child, when he is old enough to do so, may decide to learn the subject on his own, and if he does so, one reason he will have is that mathematics is, quite simply, a good (worthwhile, valuable) thing. There is something right about this idea: you may permissibly do certain things that have bad consequences for yourself that others may not justifiably impose on you. So, we must consider the merits of the hypothesis that one reason why one should teach oneself mathematics is that doing so is, quite simply, good. My reaction to this proposal is that we can be more articulate than this about the value of this subject. We can say that mathematics expands one's mind by increasing one's powers of imagination, abstraction, deduction, and inference. It can make one more creative. It can also enlarge and satisfy one's sense of beauty. And here is the most important point about these mind-expanding activities: they are all good for one's mind. Now, if these claims are accepted, should we add that there is yet another reason to learn it—namely that doing so is a good thing? I submit that there is no such reason. When people say that learning mathematics is “by itself worthwhile,” they may be referring precisely to the mind-expanding features of the subject that I have just mentioned. Of course, I cannot prove that there is not one further reason to study mathematics beyond the ones that are constituted by its effects on the inquiring mind, namely its absolute goodness. But it seems implausible that something has been left out of the case for learning this subject, once its benefits, both instrumental and non-instrumental, are taken into account. Another example I appeal to is that of a doctor who is intent on eradicating cancer simply because he thinks its presence in the universe is “a bad thing,” and is indifferent to the harms it does to those who suffer from it. Stroud remarks that she would like to be the patient of so devoted a doctor, were she ever stricken with this disease. She adds: “Viewing cancer as an unremitting evil, to be eradicated with all the powers at one's disposal, might be a very effective spur to determined and creative cancer treatment—however ‘impersonal’ the doctor's attitude.” I agree with her to this extent: we can make very good use of such a doctor (assuming that he is an effective enemy of what he perceives to be, not a harm to human beings, but an evil in the universe). But for me the important question, for the purposes of ethical theory, is this: does he have a good reason for his opposition to cancer? The answer can be no, even though, for practical purposes, we should choose such a doctor over one who is opposed to cancer for good reasons but is less effective. I turn next to Stroud's observation that we often need to make all-things-considered judgments about which action we should undertake. She is worried that the concept of what is good for someone (oneself or others) is not the one we need in order to make these judgments, and suggests that the concept of what is good absolutely is the one that we do need. As she says, we often need to aggregate facts about what is good or bad for several people, weighing the well-being of some against the harm that will occur to others. We have to decide which of our alternatives is best (or least bad). It seems that here we need to decide which is best (or least bad) period. The same (or a very similar) concern is expressed by Thomson in section 5 of her critique. She writes: “It is very plausible that X is BETTER THAN Y only if: X and Y have VALUES, and X's VALUE is greater than Y's. It is very plausible that a thing's VALUE is the amount of its GOODNESS (which might be 0) minus the amount of its BADNESS (which might be 0). Thus it is very plausible that X is BETTER THAN Y only if there are such properties as GOODNESS and BADNESS.” I hope that my response to Thomson's statement will suffice as a response to Stroud's concern as well. It might seem surprising, but if I am right, although we need a concept of absolute betterness, we do not therefore need a concept of absolute goodness as well. (I address this question more fully in Chapters 16 and 17 of my book.) At one point, Stroud asks: “For what values of S is ‘x is good [bad] for S’ reason-providing?” (her emphasis). I believe that in the right circumstances what is good or bad for any human being or any person provides reasons to help him or her in an appropriate way. Further, the well-being of other conscious beings is also, in the right circumstances, reason-providing. By contrast, I believe that although plants should not be wantonly destroyed, their good does not provide us with reasons to assist them. Artifacts too should not be wantonly destroyed, but for a different reason: they exist to meet our needs, whereas plants do not. Stroud anticipates these replies, but she says: “one looks for principled grounds for these sharp distinctions.” I believe that where there are sharp distinctions in this area, that is because of sharp differences between the kinds of benefits under consideration. Some kinds of benefits, being much greater than other kinds, create stronger reasons. The idea that I propose in my book is that just as we can make sense of comparisons between the well-being of two human beings, we can also meaningfully compare how great a benefit it is for a human being to be alive with the benefit an oyster (for example) derives from being alive. When the benefit that can be provided to a creature is comparatively small, the strength of the reason to assist it or to refrain from harming it is similarly small. It is not as though oysters have a lower “moral standing” regardless of the quality of life they can have; rather, their lower status is to be explained in terms of how little there is in their lives. Finally, Stroud notes that since I defend the proposition that (3) “x's being good for S is reason providing” (I would add: for some kinds of S), I may be committed to more abstract and bolder claims: (4) “x's being E is reason-providing only when E is an evaluative feature;” and (5) “when we have a reason to ... x ..., this is always the case because x is E, where E is an evaluative feature.” These further propositions, (4) and (5), do seem plausible to me, if they are understood in the right way (a proviso I will soon explain). When we say that someone is getting some pleasure from what he is doing, we are not yet evaluating his activity. “He is pleased” is a description of his state of mind, not an evaluation of it. If we add, “he should be pleased,” something needs to be said about why this is so. We need to say that pleasure is always good (period), or that this particular pleasure is a good pleasure, or that pleasure is always good for us, or that this particular pleasure is good for him, or something else that evaluates what he is doing. The same point could be made about other descriptions of someone's physical or psychological condition. If we say, for example, “you should skip that movie, because you will be bored,” some further claim must lie in the background to support this inference. If boredom were a good condition for you to be in, the inference would fail. Boredom should be avoided because it is, on the contrary, a bad condition to be in—not bad absolutely (the universe is no worse a place when you are bored)—but non-instrumentally bad for you. In our everyday discourse, we frequently do not bother filling in what needs to be supplied if such inferences are to be acceptable. To take another example drawn from Thomson's critique: It sounds perfectly acceptable to say that “Alfred has a reason to take Norvasc because doing so would lower his blood pressure.” That is because we assume that it is bad for him to have such high blood pressure. Similarly, it is perfectly acceptable to say: “What you are doing is making him suffer greatly, so you must stop.” That is because we rightly take it for granted that pain merits a negative evaluation: it is bad for the person who feels it. (Notice this asymmetry between pleasure and pain: all pain is non-instrumentally bad for us, but not all pleasure is non-instrumentally good for us. Working with this standing assumption, we can immediately give a negative evaluation of pain, but cannot immediately give a positive evaluation of pleasure.) That is why I said that propositions, (4) and (5) are plausible if they are understood in the right way. They should be read in a way that recognizes that nothing is amiss when we say: “the movie will be boring, which is reason enough not to see it.” In saying this, we tacitly accept some negative evaluation of the state of boredom. Which negative evaluation is that? Friends of absolute goodness say: boredom is a bad thing. I say instead: it is bad for us. I will close by pointing out that there is nonetheless a problem that can be raised about Stroud's propositions (4) and (5). Recall what they say: (4) “x's being E is reason-providing only when E is an evaluative feature”; and (5) “when we have a reason to ... x ..., this is always the case because x is E, where E is an evaluative feature.” The problem is this: what is meant by ‘an evaluative feature’? If an evaluative feature is simply any consideration that is reason-providing, then these propositions are concealed tautologies. The solution to this problem, perhaps, is to agree upon a list of evaluative features. There may be little or nothing we can say about what they have in common that makes them so. Nonetheless, having made clear which features are evaluative, (4) and (5) become bold claims that deserve careful reflection. Modified in this way, they say: “here are the features of the world that give us reason to value the things that possess them.” I am confident that something's being good for a person is one of those features. But I am skeptical that being absolutely good is also one of them. Thomson thinks I need an account of what it is to value something. I accept her suggestion that valuing a thing is at least this: thinking well of it. She then adds: “how could it fail to be the case that a thing's being GOOD is a reason for thinking well of it?” That is of course exactly the rhetorical question that a friend of absolute goodness would ask. But Thomson is no friend of absolute goodness. She addresses this question to me because she attributes to me the belief that it is (in her words) “an open question” whether there is such a property. More fully, she attributes to me the view that “if there is such a property as GOODNESS, then it anyway isn't a reason-giving property.” makes it as though the of my book is as I begin by asking whether there is such a property as goodness. I decide to that question at least I then that even if there is such a property as it nonetheless is not a reason-giving property. I about whether there is such a property. If that been my I would have been in precisely the way Thomson If I open the question whether there is such a property as then the of goodness will rightly “how could it fail to be the case that a thing's being good is a reason for thinking well of it?” So, I to think of my book as in a different way. I to the of goodness that when they say that certain things and so are absolutely they are I from Thomson's She writes: as many have or pleasure, what exactly do they said there is no good reason to think they at ... In the But although I take the of absolute goodness to be I do not that there is such a property as goodness. As I say from the in which we something a good thing are but not all The of my is devoted to the that absolute goodness is not a reason-giving property. It is a further question whether it is any of property at But I claim that once become that goodness is not a reason-giving they will have no good for thinking that nonetheless there is such a property as goodness. Thomson next suggests that in order to the problem she raises there is this absolute how could it not be I might accept a account of goodness. She writes: that would that we should the of ... a thing to be GOOD is for there to be a reason for valuing it, a reason other than the fact that the thing is In a to that she adds: a thing to have the property of being good or is simply for there to be some reason or other to value it. that reason is, it is not goodness or but something are my But they in a of and the from which the is taken is an explanation of what view I do not say or in that that I accept I accept me when he says: rightly from the As I that it would be a response to such of absolute goodness as to against that absolute goodness the that something's goodness is a reason to value it. If one's only were simply to that this is so, one would not be making There is nonetheless something in account of goodness. As I say: ... agree that sometimes when people say is they simply that there is a reason to favor or value that which they good. That is one common use of such But I immediately add: is not the way to use them. ... I do not believe that his that goodness is a reason-giving property should be on the grounds that it a of the The I in my book, in other makes no use of idea that absolute goodness the To the that Thomson's on the hypothesis that I on they are off the In the section of her she claims that one of the I use against of absolute goodness is to what they say and believe about it. What she has in mind is this: I think that one reason why people should take is that are non-instrumentally good for them. are as but that is another If I am right about then we must with when he says: only reason that can justify any action is that by it the amount what is good absolutely should be That statement him to saying that there is only one reason for people to take doing so is good does more good than any this, I say that whether or not a is good it is good for people, and that by itself is reason enough for them to do so. But because I my of absolute goodness to be I must also consider the that there are two reasons to take a it is non-instrumentally good for it is good (in other it the amount of value in the even from its this point, Thomson is that I am the of absolute goodness. She thinks they have never and never would say, that these are two reasons that must be she is right about so, the question whether these two different kinds of reasons should be ought to be I assume that Thomson is not me to for doing so. some other things that of absolute goodness have sometimes put on their list of good knowledge and for we accept that consider what about knowledge and they are good for us having view is no to Perhaps more can be said in favor of knowledge and than We should not this a Similarly, we ought to consider the that value lies both in its being good and its being good for us. But when we give this hypothesis consideration, we ought to it. I am to see that Thomson and I are in about is where we I propose that the reason why pleasure, and are not to be for two because they are good for us and because they are absolutely that absolute goodness is not a reason-giving property. She suggests that the of absolute goodness can to that it is a reason-giving even though we do not have more reason to things that are good and good for us than we have to things that are good or good for us. She on this has a reason to take Norvasc because doing so would lower his blood pressure. also has a reason to take Norvasc because doing so would be good for But these are not reasons that are to be the in favor of the is this: should do what is good for his blood is good for Norvasc will lower his blood pressure. he should take some compare this with an for a “It would give him much is good for in these circumstances, do what is good for So, he should take a The of absolute goodness say that the most of all has been That is good (period). Thomson that we take them to be the fact that a would be good for him is a reason for him to do so only because doing what is good for him is also good (period). facts about what is good for someone are never on their that they become reason-giving only by of the fact that what is good for someone is also good I frequently to make this point by that the case against can be expressed by saying that is bad for people because what it to is bad for them. is bad would be a thing to say, is bad for its from the fact that what it to is bad for us. The in the against is not that its consequences are bad (period), or that they make the universe a worse place by filling it with The is that what to is bad for We should not be by Thomson's point about She is right that of absolute goodness can that example for the of that about what is good for someone and about what is good absolutely can be But if they do so, they must take on this just as the fact that a would lower someone's blood never counts by itself as a reason for the on whether doing so would be good for so the fact that a state of affairs is good for someone or bad for someone never counts by itself as a reason to value or it on whether what is good for someone is good absolutely and whether what is bad for someone is bad Thomson in my view that pleasure is not by itself a reason. As I in my to him, I am by the fact that and it to be an important to whether pleasure is always sometimes or never good. is a of but I take them to be not whether pleasure is absolutely but whether it is good for us. I take the that with to be the of pleasure as our because it that pleasure is a to serve as the good for human The would have it to that we should pleasure a place in our asking whether it that and they therefore about whether pleasure is itself the of or whether its derives from the fact that it and of and that pleasure is to be and that it is to be by asking whether it is good for us. By contrast, Thomson that to is saying something that is itself in a As it that sounds for reasons. If I say that the doctor her patient pain, and then add that she doing so, I may with that point be about what The state of affairs by the doctor seems to be a worse state of affairs because her pleasure is a of it. To take a very different of if a pleasure from an his pleasure is bad for In the pleasure he feels is of what makes his bad for him, because it as the that him to his activity. will Perhaps Thomson will say that the very fact that this a is itself a reason why he should this That of course is with her that there are stronger reasons why he should She might think that like this one are and should be avoided because there are to be If that is her she is not from what most of the would say about this She would be saying that some are to be only to a very and others to a much greater like and would be in the of and worse and some as further point about Some in order to be good of their ought to be Thomson several of them. She says: “if you say about a friend or a movie that she or it is you have said something that is itself in a about her or it.” friend that does not how to be to you is not a good Similarly, one way in which can be good is by being and so is what we from several Another a ought to be and But we should not infer from these examples that when we are making or evaluating the of we should always pleasure as a reason. There are when you should not to be to pleasure should on certain be entirely left out of consideration. In section Thomson the on of the of absolute “It is very plausible that X is BETTER THAN Y only if: X and Y have VALUES, and X's VALUE is greater than Y's. It is very plausible that a thing's VALUE is the amount of its GOODNESS (which might be 0) minus the amount of its BADNESS (which might be 0). Thus it is very plausible that X is BETTER THAN Y only if there are such properties as GOODNESS and BADNESS.” I assume that she is about one state of affairs being than (I doubt that she means that if one is than then it must have more goodness as a but with an In state of affairs one people who are from a that their In state of affairs one different people who are from that same that their pain to a than is the case in We have to decide which to and our a In state of affairs X we help people than we do in state of affairs But in state of affairs Y the amount of help is Which is to think that we should the amount of pain that would be and therefore choose Y over We are so many more people that way, even though the amount of help we give is (I do not that we should all in this am not a But in this case, we should do the most The important point is this: state of affairs Y is made than X because pain is a is bad for there is less of what is bad for people in Y than in me, that is the of the Thomson's however, that even if it is that when we aggregate what is good for people there is a amount of what is good for in Y than in nonetheless what makes Y than X is that it a certain amount of

Philosophy

• Symbolic value and the limits of good‐for theory

  Open Access•Aaron Abma•Noûs•2025

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