Symbolic value and the limits of good‐for theory

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21364047
AutoresAaron Abma (0000-0002-7455-2006, Department of Philosophy Le Moyne College Syracuse New York USA, autor de correspondencia)
Año2025
Volumen59
Número2
Páginas542-563
Fecha de publicación2025-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaNoûs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12518
OpenAlexW4401160690
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas93

Good‐for theorists claim that to be valuable is to be good for someone, in the sense of being beneficial for them. Their opponents deny this, arguing that some things are good‐simpliciter: good independently of being good for anyone. In this article I argue in favor of good‐simpliciter. I appeal to the category of symbolically valuable acts, acts which seem valuable even when they do not benefit anyone and even when they are costly to the agent. I explore various strategies a good‐for theorist might pursue to address these apparently valuable acts, for example by appealing to the acts’ connection to beneficial character traits or practices, and I argue that none of these strategies succeed. Instead, I propose that the best way to understand the value of these acts involves seeing them as appropriate responses to what is good‐simpliciter, and more specifically, as ways of loving what is worthy of love

Mathematical economics · Statistics · Value (mathematics) · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History