Practical conflicts as a problem for epistemic reductionism about practical reasons
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10348952 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Benjamin Kiesewetter (0000-0001-9409-3620, Humboldt‐Universität zu Berlin, Institut für Philosophie Berlin Germany, corresponding author), Jan Gertken (0000-0002-6175-5031, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 105 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 677-686 |
| Publication date | 2021-10-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12835 |
| OpenAlex | W3206540018 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 29 |
According to epistemic reductionism about practical reasons, facts about practical reasons can be reduced to facts about evidence for ought‐judgements. We argue that this view misconstrues practical conflicts. At least some conflicts between practical reasons put us in a position to know that an action φ is optional , i.e. that we neither ought to perform nor ought to refrain from performing the action. By understanding conflicts of practical reasons as conflicts of evidence about what one ought to do, epistemic reductionism fails to account for this. In conflict cases in which φ‐ing is optional, epistemic reductionism suggests that we have equally strong evidence for and against assuming that we ought to φ, and thus cannot be in a position to know that it is not the case that we ought to φ. This is a serious flaw
Action (physics · Economics · Epistemology · Physics · Position (finance · Reductionism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity
Reasons
The Distinction between Justifying and Requiring
Ethical Consistency
Slaves of the Passions
A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence
Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do
Do Reasons and Evidence Share the Same Residence
Replies to Cuneo, Driver, and Littlejohn
The Normativity of Rationality
You ought to φ only if you may believe that you ought to φ
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |