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Jan Gertken

Biographic Data

ID1086887
NAMEJan Gertken
GIVEN NAMESJan
FAMILY NAMEGertken
SIGNATUREGERTKEN J
AFFILIATIONSHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin
ORCID0000-0002-6175-5031
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS11
AUTHOR COUNT3
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2017
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
H-INDEX1
  • How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means

    Open Access•Benjamin Kiesewetter, Jan Gertken•ARTICLE•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•2021

    Which principles govern the transmission of reasons from ends to means? Some philosophers have suggested a liberal transmission principle, according to which agents have an instrumental reason for an action whenever this action is a means for them to do what they have non-instrumental reason to do. In this paper, we (i) discuss the merits and demerits of the liberal transmission principle, (ii) argue that there are good reasons to reject it, and …

  • Practical conflicts as a problem for epistemic reductionism about practical reasons

    Open Access•Benjamin Kiesewetter, Jan Gertken•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2021•References: 5

    According to epistemic reductionism about practical reasons, facts about practical reasons can be reduced to facts about evidence for ought‐judgements. We argue that this view misconstrues practical conflicts. At least some conflicts between practical reasons put us in a position to know that an action φ is optional , i.e. that we neither ought to perform nor ought to refrain from performing the action. By understanding conflicts of practical rea…

  • The right and the wrong kind of reasons

    Open Access•Jan Gertken, Benjamin Kiesewetter•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2017•Cited by: 11•References: 40

    In a number of recent philosophical debates, it has become common to distinguish between two kinds of normative reasons, often calledthe right kind of reasons(henceforth, RKR) andthe wrong kind of reasons(henceforth, WKR). The distinction was first introduced in discussions of the so-calledbuck-passing account of value, which aims to analyze value properties in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes and has been argued to face thewrong kind of reason…

  • The right and the wrong kind of reasons

    Open Access•Jan Gertken, Benjamin Kiesewetter•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2017•Cited by: 11•References: 40

    In a number of recent philosophical debates, it has become common to distinguish between two kinds of normative reasons, often calledthe right kind of reasons(henceforth, RKR) andthe wrong kind of reasons(henceforth, WKR). The distinction was first introduced in discussions of the so-calledbuck-passing account of value, which aims to analyze value properties in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes and has been argued to face thewrong kind of reason…

  • The right and the wrong kind of reasons

    Open Access•Jan Gertken, Benjamin Kiesewetter•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2017•Cited by: 11•References: 40

    In a number of recent philosophical debates, it has become common to distinguish between two kinds of normative reasons, often calledthe right kind of reasons(henceforth, RKR) andthe wrong kind of reasons(henceforth, WKR). The distinction was first introduced in discussions of the so-calledbuck-passing account of value, which aims to analyze value properties in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes and has been argued to face thewrong kind of reason…

  • How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means

    Open Access•Benjamin Kiesewetter, Jan Gertken•ARTICLE•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•2021

    Which principles govern the transmission of reasons from ends to means? Some philosophers have suggested a liberal transmission principle, according to which agents have an instrumental reason for an action whenever this action is a means for them to do what they have non-instrumental reason to do. In this paper, we (i) discuss the merits and demerits of the liberal transmission principle, (ii) argue that there are good reasons to reject it, and …

  • Practical conflicts as a problem for epistemic reductionism about practical reasons

    Open Access•Benjamin Kiesewetter, Jan Gertken•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2021•References: 5

    According to epistemic reductionism about practical reasons, facts about practical reasons can be reduced to facts about evidence for ought‐judgements. We argue that this view misconstrues practical conflicts. At least some conflicts between practical reasons put us in a position to know that an action φ is optional , i.e. that we neither ought to perform nor ought to refrain from performing the action. By understanding conflicts of practical rea…

Epistemology (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Physics (2 works) · Action (physics (1 works) · Action (physics) (1 works) · Economics (1 works)

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