How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means

Bibliographic Data

ID21293413
AuthorsBenjamin Kiesewetter (0000-0001-9409-3620, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin), Jan Gertken (0000-0002-6175-5031, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
Year2021
Volume99
Issue2
Pages271-285
Publication date2021-04-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2020.1745252
OpenAlexW3021160278
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited21

Which principles govern the transmission of reasons from ends to means? Some philosophers have suggested a liberal transmission principle, according to which agents have an instrumental reason for an action whenever this action is a means for them to do what they have non-instrumental reason to do. In this paper, we (i) discuss the merits and demerits of the liberal transmission principle, (ii) argue that there are good reasons to reject it, and (iii) present an alternative, less liberal transmission principle, which allows us to accommodate those phenomena that seem to support the liberal transmission principle while avoiding its problems

Action (physics) · Epistemology · Physics · Telecommunications · Transmission (telecommunications) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

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