Looks and Perceptual Justification

Bibliographic Data

ID10349986
AuthorsMorag Mcgrath (0000-0003-2055-6914, Andrews University, corresponding author), Matthew Mcgrath (University of Missouri and Arché University of St Andrews)
Year2016
Volume96
Issue1
Pages110-133
Publication date2016-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpr.12289
OpenAlexW2314139375
LanguageEN
Citations received16
References cited26

Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks view of the justification of simple visual beliefs. According to the looks view, such beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning how the relevant things look. Unlike under classical foundationalism, under the looks view as I develop it, these reasons are public . They are public with respect to both their content and possession: with respect to content, they are not about ourselves and our experiences, and with respect to their possession, many people can have the very same looks‐related reasons

Content (measure theory · Epistemology · Foundationalism · Linguistics · Perception · Possession (linguistics · Simple (philosophy · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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