On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure

Bibliographic Data

ID4352286
AuthorsDominic Alford‐duguid (0000-0002-9213-4369, University of British Columbia, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume74
Issue1
Pages1-23
Publication date2023-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqad015
OpenAlexW4321372119
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited27

Our awareness of the boundedness of the spatial sensory field-a paradigmatic structural feature of visual experience-possesses a distinctive epistemic role. Properly understood, this result undermines a widely assumed picture of how visual experience permits us to learn about the world. This paper defends an alternative picture in which visual experience provides at least two kinds of non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external world. Accommodating this justification in turn requires recognising a new way for visual experience to encode information about the world. Reflection upon the epistemic contribution of sensory experience's structural features thus forces us to revise our understanding of how perception, cognition, and the world fit together

Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Feature (linguistics · Field (mathematics · Linguistics · Perception · Reflection (computer programming · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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