Dominic Alford‐duguid
Biographic Data
| ID | 3597539 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dominic Alford‐duguid |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dominic |
| FAMILY NAME | Alford‐duguid |
| SIGNATURE | DUGUID D A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford Oxford United Kingdom |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9213-4369 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Perceiving Particulars
Causalists contend that you see a specific object (rather than a lookalike, or no object at all) because that object sits at the beginning of an appropriate causal chain that terminates in your visual experience. We argue that neither standard causalists nor their non‐causalist opponents can adequately accommodate a striking asymmetry between perception and thought. The asymmetry concerns the conditions under which a thought or sensory experience…
Learning from presupposition
P. F. Strawson famously distinguishes what a speaker presupposes from what she asserts in uttering a sentence like “The present King of France is bald”. This paper defends a claim about presupposition's epistemic significance, namely that presupposition can provide a distinctive testimony‐based way for an audience to learn about the world
On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure
Our awareness of the boundedness of the spatial sensory field-a paradigmatic structural feature of visual experience-possesses a distinctive epistemic role. Properly understood, this result undermines a widely assumed picture of how visual experience permits us to learn about the world. This paper defends an alternative picture in which visual experience provides at least two kinds of non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external w…
Thinking through illusion
Perception of a property (e.g., a colour, a shape, and a size) can enable thought about the property, while at the same time misleading the subject as to what the property is like. This long‐overlooked claim parallels a more familiar observation concerning perception‐based thought about objects, namely that perception can enable a subject to think about an object while at the same time misleading her as to what the object is like. I defend the ov…
Thought about Properties: Why the Perceptual Case is Basic
This paper defends a version of the old empiricist claim that to think about unobservable physical properties (such as spin or charge) a subject must be able to think perception-based thoughts about observable properties (such as red or circularity). The central argument builds upon foundations laid down by G. E. M. Anscombe and P. F. Strawson. It bridges the gap separating these foundations and the target claim by exploiting a neglected connecti…
On the explanatory power of hallucination
On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure
Our awareness of the boundedness of the spatial sensory field-a paradigmatic structural feature of visual experience-possesses a distinctive epistemic role. Properly understood, this result undermines a widely assumed picture of how visual experience permits us to learn about the world. This paper defends an alternative picture in which visual experience provides at least two kinds of non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external w…
Thought about Properties: Why the Perceptual Case is Basic
This paper defends a version of the old empiricist claim that to think about unobservable physical properties (such as spin or charge) a subject must be able to think perception-based thoughts about observable properties (such as red or circularity). The central argument builds upon foundations laid down by G. E. M. Anscombe and P. F. Strawson. It bridges the gap separating these foundations and the target claim by exploiting a neglected connecti…
On the explanatory power of hallucination
On the explanatory power of hallucination
Thought about Properties: Why the Perceptual Case is Basic
This paper defends a version of the old empiricist claim that to think about unobservable physical properties (such as spin or charge) a subject must be able to think perception-based thoughts about observable properties (such as red or circularity). The central argument builds upon foundations laid down by G. E. M. Anscombe and P. F. Strawson. It bridges the gap separating these foundations and the target claim by exploiting a neglected connecti…
Thinking through illusion
Perception of a property (e.g., a colour, a shape, and a size) can enable thought about the property, while at the same time misleading the subject as to what the property is like. This long‐overlooked claim parallels a more familiar observation concerning perception‐based thought about objects, namely that perception can enable a subject to think about an object while at the same time misleading her as to what the object is like. I defend the ov…
On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure
Our awareness of the boundedness of the spatial sensory field-a paradigmatic structural feature of visual experience-possesses a distinctive epistemic role. Properly understood, this result undermines a widely assumed picture of how visual experience permits us to learn about the world. This paper defends an alternative picture in which visual experience provides at least two kinds of non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external w…
Learning from presupposition
P. F. Strawson famously distinguishes what a speaker presupposes from what she asserts in uttering a sentence like “The present King of France is bald”. This paper defends a claim about presupposition's epistemic significance, namely that presupposition can provide a distinctive testimony‐based way for an audience to learn about the world
Perceiving Particulars
Causalists contend that you see a specific object (rather than a lookalike, or no object at all) because that object sits at the beginning of an appropriate causal chain that terminates in your visual experience. We argue that neither standard causalists nor their non‐causalist opponents can adequately accommodate a striking asymmetry between perception and thought. The asymmetry concerns the conditions under which a thought or sensory experience…
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Perception (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (2 works)