Thought about Properties

Why the Perceptual Case is Basic

Bibliographic Data

ID4351853
AuthorsDominic Alford-Duguid (King's College London), Dominic Alford‐duguid (0000-0002-9213-4369, King's College London, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume68
Issue271
Pages221-242
Publication date2018-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqx042
OpenAlexW2753374511
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited24

This paper defends a version of the old empiricist claim that to think about unobservable physical properties (such as spin or charge) a subject must be able to think perception-based thoughts about observable properties (such as red or circularity). The central argument builds upon foundations laid down by G. E. M. Anscombe and P. F. Strawson. It bridges the gap separating these foundations and the target claim by exploiting a neglected connection between thought about properties and our grasp of causation. This way of bridging the gap promises to introduce substantive constraints on right accounts of perception and perception-based thought.

Argument (complex analysis) · Bridging (networking) · Causation · Empiricism · Epistemology · GRASP · Perception · Subject (documents) · Unobservable · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Quantum Mechanics and Applications

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